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Abstract
This thesis explores the evidence of allocentric visual processing in primates with the purpose of 
illuminating a proposed co-evolution of more advanced visual perception and cognition in humans 
and closely related primates. The thesis is divided into three distinct parts, that in turn deal with 
three different aspects of this task. Part I reviews the last twenty years of research into the two 
visual systems hypothesis, proposed originally by Ungerleider and Mishkin in 1982, that separated 
the human visual system into two discrete subsystems named the dorsal and ventral streams. Differ-
ent models for the functional subdivision of the human visual system are reviewed and discussed. 
The ventral stream is considered to handle allocentric visual processing, and is only found in prim-
ates, and it is argued that this is a prerequisite for visual object recognition and conscious sight, 
making this neurological pathway a stepping stone in the evolution of our cognitive systems. Part II 
considers the behavioural evidence of allocentric perception in different species of primates by link-
ing such perception to different behavioural and cognitive abilities, and proposes a model to inter-
pret the available data and guide further research into the visual capabilities of apes and monkeys. 
Part III discusses why allocentric perception is an important factor in the evolution of human cogni-
tion,  and considers some more specific  cognitive capabilities  that  could have evolved from the 
benefits of having allocentric visual processing.
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Introduction
It is no longer believed that the only function of the human visual system is to construct a 
mental visual model of the world, and to use this inner model to guide behaviour in the world. 
Rather, the visual system is divided into two parts, one that handles the control of motor beha-
viour in response to visual information, and the other that makes us aware of our environment 
and allows us to identify objects and make decisions about what actions to take. The evidence 
actually suggests, perhaps contra-intuitively, that the latter kind of function is not the most 
common function of animals visual systems – it seems that it might only be primates (and per-
haps some other species) that are able to use visual information in this way. In most other see-
ing animals, visual information is used to control motor action without any conscious pro-
cessing, the information is directly translated into motor commands. This means that other 
animals, even though they have sight, are not aware of any visual properties of the world, and 
rely on other kinds of sensory information for identifying objects and making decisions about 
actions. Humans on the other hand rely extensively on visual information, and so does other 
primates. The evolution of this function of the visual system seems to have happened in the 
primate lineage, and any such function in other animals is likely to have evolved separately.
There are a number of aspects of the primate visual system that sets it apart from other 
closely related species, and among them are more detailed central vision, extended colour vis-
ion and the ability to encode visual information in allocentric coordinates. These are proper-
ties that are essential for the visual system to be able to identify objects and create conscious 
perception of the world in the way that we experience it. Allocentric processing is needed to 
relate visual stimuli to each other, and it can be argued that object identification is not possible  
unless different parts of the object can be related to each other and the object can be related to 
its environment. I will argue that being able to process visual information in this way is a pre-
requisite for certain  other cognitive abilities and skills that we find in primates but generally 
not in any other mammals.
Thesis purpose and overview
This thesis is aimed at describing why allocentric perception is such an important prerequisite 
for other cognitive abilities and linking it to such abilities. In order to do this it is necessary to 
dissect the visual system into functional parts to crystallize what allocentric processing is and 
what it is not. It is also of interest to see which primate species have what abilities, as this 
could potentially reveal something about the evolution of allocentric perception. Because of 
insufficient data about many primate species, the present thesis will not be able to make any 
such claims, but rather make suggestions for future research that could illuminate this ques-
tion. I will present a model that can be used to guide research in order to make progress this 
field. 
This thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part is a review of the last thirty years 
of research into the two visual systems of the primate, placing emphasis on models that make 
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a distinction between a system for unconscious visuomotor control and another for conscious 
visual perception. Different perspectives on functional distinctions are presented, with focus 
on the perceptual function and its ability to encode visual information in allocentric coordin-
ates. The second part considers the evidence for allocentric perception in different species of 
primates and how it is linked to different cognitive abilities and behaviours. I also propose a 
model for further research on allocentric perception. The third part takes a more philosophical 
perspective on on visual perception and discusses what I believe to be its important role in the 
evolution of more advanced cognitive abilities in primates, especially humans. I will also hint 
at some possible ways of doing empirical research to further investigate my ideas. The third 
part also serves the purpose of tying the thesis together.
About this thesis
Since this thesis is meant to be readable by all cognitive scientists, it has been necessary to 
explain some of the biological facts at a pretty basic level. The biologically inclined reader 
might be annoyed by the explanations and oversimplifications that are abound, but I hope that 
he or she can look past this and hopefully find something interesting and useful in the reason-
ing about cognition, which after all is the main area for this thesis. I am not a biologist, so 
there is the possibility that I might have misconstrued some of the finer points of this field. 
However, I am reasonably assured that any such error would not be in conflict with the main 
points of this work.
The decision to limit this investigation only to primate species has good reasons. While 
there are other species that might have allocentric perception, they are not closely related to 
primates, meaning that their visual systems most likely have separate evolutionary histories. 
Comparisons with closely related animals without allocentric perception would of course also 
have been interesting, but the research into the visual systems of most other species than 
primates is  very  sparse,  not  to  say erratic.  Allocentric  perception is  closely linked to  the 
bifurcation of the cortical visual system that only seems to be present in primates. Whether or 
not it is present in other species is not completely settled (for a brief review of some conflict-
ing research into the matter, see Ellard, 1998), but there are reasons to believe that this cor-
tical organization might not be present or certainly not as developed in other species. Many 
species, for instance rodents that are among the closest relatives of primates, do not have a 
foveated retina (Ellard, 1998) and without a fovea the acuity of the available visual informa-
tion is arguably not fine enough to support an equivalence of the ventral stream. One of the 
main functions of the ventral stream seems to be object identification, something which many 
primates, and especially humans, do by means of vision. For most other mammals the main 
way of identifying objects is by olfaction (primate, 2009, In Encyclopædia Britannica Online), 
which, while it does not rule out the presence of an equivalence of the ventral stream, would 
make it much less likely to be present.
Comparative studies of more closely related species is often easier to do and can supply 
more reliable data. So, when we are interested in the evolution of human traits, a good place 
to start  is therefore in other primate species, and especially the great apes. This is however 
6
not enough, since you really need knowledge about other less closely related species as well, 
in order to create a context for your comparisons to make sense. For instance, the notion that 
chimpanzees and humans are similar in many respects is only an interesting observation in the 
light of both species being less similar to other species, like rabbits or haddocks (not to men-
tion amoeba, trees or even gloves or newspaper subscriptions). There is also a risk of focusing 
too much attention to chimpanzees and other great apes when doing research into the evolu-
tion of human traits;  “It  is  equally  important  to  look at distantly  related species to  gain  
insights about the way cognitive systems evolved when faced with particular selective pres-
sures.” (Call, 2004, p. 248) This is of course yet another reason to hope for more research into  
the cortical visual systems of a wider variety of species.
A note on Swedish animal research laws
Originally this thesis was supposed to be an empirical enquiry into the visual systems of prim-
ates  with  ethological  studies  of  a  number  of  different  species  (mainly  great  apes).  This 
endeavour was regrettably hindered by Swedish law and bureaucratic inflexibility. Swedish 
law forbids any research that includes animals (excluding humans for some reason) without 
specific permits from the National Board of Agriculture. While it is easy to see the reason for 
this law – the protection and welfare of animals – and to sympathize with this cause, it is 
unfortunate that the law does not differentiate between invasive and non-invasive research. 
Even just looking at an animal and documenting its behaviour is punishable by up to two 
years in prison, which illustrates the lack of sense in this oversimplified legislation. In the 
case of great apes, this law is actually counterproductive since captive great apes are stimu-
lated by and enjoy the interaction with researchers (Josep Call, Mathias Osvath, 2009, per-
sonal communications). 
In order to protect and hopefully increase great ape populations, research into said species 
is of course of great value, so also in this sense is the Swedish legislation actually counterpro-
ductive. Strict control of invasive animal research is a good thing to limit animal suffering, 
but non-invasive observational studies should not be subject to the same control and unneces-
sary bureaucracy. It should also be noted that EU law demands that zoo's to partake in (non-
invasive) animal research in order to be allowed to hold animals captive. The zoo representat-
ives  that  I  have  been  in  contact  with  have  very  positive  attitudes  towards  observational 
research on their animals and see no risk of animals being harmed in the process. 
In the case of this paper, the necessary resources (time and money) where not available to 
get the required permissions. This means that the present study relies on observational data 
from various other researchers. I have also changed the emphasis from the original empirical 
framework towards a more philosophical angle on the evolution of the cortical visual system 
in primates and its role in the evolution of cognition as a whole, and sketching guidelines for 
future research. In retrospect it has become a completely different creation than what was ini-
tially intended. It might just be that the result is a better paper in the end, since the time avail-
able for observations would have been somewhat limited compared to what is preferable in 
behavioural studies. However it is regrettable that I was not able to get a deeper understanding 
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of the behaviour of various species of primates that is only available through thorough obser-
vation, as this could have had an enhancing influence on the present paper.
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PART 1
Two visual systems
1.1 Introduction
There is a massive body of scientific evidence that the primate cortex processes visual inform-
ation in two neurologically separated and distinct streams emanating from the primary visual 
cortex (V1). While the anatomical and neurological properties of the streams have been quite 
clearly  established (Goodale & Milner,  2006),  their  functional  characteristics have been a 
source of debate for the last three decades, a debate that is still active and fuelling research 
projects and articles. The most widely accepted model for the functional division was sugges-
ted by Goodale and Milner in 1992, and it has since been elaborated and well investigated. 
This model is the main foundation for this thesis and will receive the most attention, but other 
proposals will be examined as well.
1.2 Neuroanatomy of the primate visual system
The general structure of the neuroanatomy of the visual system is similar across all primates, 
including humans (Kaas, 2004). It begins, of course, with the retina of the eye, which in all 
primates  has  a  fovea  with  a  much  denser  concentration  of  photoreceptors,  in  particular 
photoreceptors that can differentiate colour information (cones). The remainder of the retina 
contains mainly photoreceptors that are only sensitive to light and not colour (rods).  Visual 
information is passed from the eyes through the optic nerves. The nerves intersect at the optic 
chiasm, and the information is reorganized into left and right visual field instead of left and 
right eye. The information from the left visual field is then transmitted in the right optic tract 
to the right lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) in the thalamus, and vice versa for the informa-
tion from the right visual field. The LGN is the first major processing centre of visual inform-
ation from the retinas, and transmits information to the primary visual cortex (V1) as well as 
other cortical areas (Gazzaniga et al., 2009).
From V1 information is transmitted through the ventral and the dorsal streams. The ventral 
stream is defined as beginning in V1 and ending in the inferior temporal cortex (IT), via V2, 
V3,  and V4. The dorsal stream is defined as beginning in V1 and ending in the posterior pari-
etal cortex, going through V2, V3, middle temporal area (MT) and the medial superior tem-
poral area (MST) (Creem & Proffitt, 2001). There are however differences in the cortices of 
different primates; these definitions and nomenclature apply to human cortex. In the macaque, 
that was used for the original definitions, the dorsal stream ends in the inferior parietal area 
rather than the posterior, but it has been argued that these two areas in the monkey and human 
are homologue (Creem & Proffitt, 2001). Similar arguments can be made for other parts of the  
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human and monkey cortices, that while the exact location on the cortex may vary there is a 
large degree of homology (Van Essen, 2005). The dorsal and ventral streams of apes can be 
divided into a larger number of differentiated areas than than in the monkeys or other prim-
ates, but the general orientations and pathways are very similar (Kaas, 2004). The general 
description is that the dorsal stream extends from the striate cortex (V1) into the parietal cor-
tex, and the ventral stream from V1 into the temporal cortex.
1.3 Two cortical visual systems: 'What' and 'Where'
The original proposal for the two visual systems was made by Leslie Ungerleider and Mor-
timer Mishkin (UM) in 1982 in a paper that has proven surprisingly hard to find, considering 
that it is seminal to this whole field and is referenced by almost every article on this matter 
since1. There had been numerous studies putting forward ideas of partitioned visual systems in 
all kinds of vertebrate species, and a few suggesting a two-fold division according to Goodale 
and Milner (1992) and Jeannerod and Jacob (2005), but UM were the first to supply the ana-
tomical and behavioural evidence for the two visual streams that has since been demonstrated 
to be present in most higher primates. The neurologically separated streams were named the 
'dorsal' and the 'ventral' stream respectively2, reflecting their locations in the cerebral cortex. 
Much of their evidence came from lesion studies with macaques, combining different loci 
of the lesions with behavioural tasks requiring different visual information, namely an object 
identification task and a landmark (spatial) task. They found that a lesion in the dorsal stream 
led to impaired performance in the landmark task, but not in the object identification task, and 
vice versa for the ventral stream. These results led them to conclude that the dorsal stream 
was responsible  for  processing spatial  visual  information  and the  ventral  stream for  pro-
1 It is only available as a chapter in a book that is long since out of print, and no library in Sweden seems to 
have a copy.
2 Standard anatomical terms, dorsal meaning towards the top of the brain and ventral towards the bottom. From 
Latin dorsum = back, venter = abdomen.
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Figure  1: Illustration of  the cortical streams of  visual pro-
cessing in the human brain, emanating from V1. The dorsal  
stream is signified by the green field (upper arrow) and the  
ventral stream by the purple field (lower arrow).
cessing information about object properties, and called them the 'space-channel' and 'object-
channel' respectively (Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005). In most of the literature they are called the 
'where' and the 'what' streams of visual processing though.
This discovery  lead to an upsurge of scientific  interest  in the visual  cortex,  and much 
research into the two visual systems of different primates including humans ensued. The exist-
ence of two neurologically distinct streams through the cortex was confirmed through several 
different methods, and for the first ten years the theory of a functional division into 'what' and 
'where' was more or less retained by the scientific community and gathered more evidence 
from the research (Goodale & Milner, 1992).
1.4 Separate visual pathways for perception and action
In 1992 Melvyn Goodale and David Milner (GM) published an article, followed by a book in 
1995, proposing another theory that proved to be even more influential on the subsequent 
research of the two visual streams. Their proposal was that the two streams served two com-
pletely different purposes for the organism. UM had assumed that the overall function of the 
two systems was perceptual awareness and that the two streams subserved two functions of 
this larger goal. GM proposed that this function was performed by the ventral stream alone, 
and that the function of the dorsal stream was of a completely different nature, namely that of 
visuomotor transformation. This concept can be described as a direct link between vision and 
motor control, the visual information is put directly to use in controlling bodily movements 
without any prior conscious awareness of it (Goodale & Milner, 1992). In their words, the 
dorsal stream handles vision for action, while the ventral stream handles vision for perception. 
The systems have also been named the 'how' and 'what' streams of visual perception.3
While the 'where' and 'what' model proposes differences in the informational input to the 
systems, the action-perception model is focused on the output of the systems and the func-
tional use of that output (i.e. motor control and perceptual awareness). “Both streams process 
information about the structure of objects and about their spatial locations, and both are sub-
ject to the modulatory influences of attention.” (Milner & Goodale, 2008, p. 774) Basically 
both system have access to the same information, but it is processed for different purposes 
and therefore producing very different output. Even though both system have potential access 
to the same visual information, that doesn't necessarily mean that both systems always or ever 
use the same information for their respective tasks.
3 The basic division of vision into action and perception can be experienced by doing a small experiment. 
Without looking, reach out to an object within your visual periphery and grasp that object. You will most 
likely succeed in grasping it in an effective and precise way, even though you were not aware of the objects 
exact position or identity. The interesting thing about peripheral vision is that while you can discern that there 
are distinct objects present, you will not be able to identify them, or most of the time even tell what colour 
they are. But reaching out and grasping any such object is most of the time no problem at all, provided that  
the object does not have a form that is difficult to perform a grasping action on.
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1.4.1 Vision for action
“[...]there  seems  [to  be]  no  reason  to  suppose  that  representational  system 
tailored to safely guide an animal's  continuous motions through its immediate  
environment would also be suitable for encoding and amplifying its theoretical 
knowledge.” (Millikan, 2004, chapter 18)
This paper is mainly concerned with the ventral stream, but for the sake of clarity there is 
reason to give a little more elaborated account of the dorsal stream and its role in vision. In 
part this is also of importance for understanding what the ventral stream does and does not do, 
especially in respect to allocentric and egocentric frames of reference.
One important aspect of vision-for-action is that it is intrinsically unconscious throughout 
the whole process chain including the actual modulation of motor action. While the decision 
to perform a certain motor action can be consciously deliberate, the adaptation of that motor 
action using available visual stimuli is an unconscious and automatic process. Another import-
ant point is that the dorsal stream has no working memory (e.g. Goodale & Haffenden, 1998; 
Goodale & Milner, 2006), all processing is done 'on-line' with the information that is being 
fed into the system at that very moment from the retinas via V1, but also directly through 
LGN in the thalamus (Ro, 2008). There is continuous informational input into the system and 
the system only has access to the current information, nothing is retained in memory for later 
use. This also means that there could be a potential difference in the control of action when 
this control is mediated by memory of visual aspects rather than direct visual input, since the 
memory of visual aspects will necessarily have resulted from processing in the ventral stream 
and not the dorsal stream (see section about visual illusions).
Jeannerod and Jacob (2005, p. 302) gave this interpretation of visuomotor transformation 
in  GM's  model:  “The  visuomotor  transformation  is  the  automatic  conversion  of  visual  
information into hand commands for reaching and grasping objects.” This account seems to 
be lacking in scope, since it is likely that processing in the dorsal stream can support more 
adverse motor control than just  reaching for or grasping objects  with ones  hands.  Firstly, 
many  primates  are  quite  adept  at  'handling'  objects  with  their  feet  (and  so  are  football 
players!), and it makes no sense that such behaviour should be subserved by another visual 
system than that which subserves control of the hands. Secondly, the dorsal stream is probably 
an evolutionarily older system than the ventral stream (see the next section), in fact it is likely 
that some equivalence of it is present in most seeing vertebrates, and most vertebrates don't 
have hands. That the dorsal stream should have evolved in primates into a specific system for 
controlling object manipulation by hand seems unlikely; it is more probable that it subserves 
all  motor control that  is  dependent  on visual  information  for successful  execution,  which 
would include transportation (e.g. walking or climbing) and obstacle avoidance, head and eye 
movements and possibly also behaviour pertaining to predators and prey (fight  and flight 
behaviour). It is not clear to me whether or not this limited interpretation of visuomotor trans-
formation is what GM had in mind, but their experimental designs and arguments does sug-
gest that they might be content with such a narrow scope. Goodale and Humphrey (1998) 
does initially describe visuomotor transformation as being object-directed action, which does 
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imply a narrow interpretation, but goes on to extend the account so that it includes actions that  
could be described as object-related rather than object-directed.
The ordinary housefly is a good example of an organism with a very simple visual system 
(but of course no cortical visual system, since flies don't have cortices) with only rudimentary 
visuomotor transformation. Basically, the fly measures the speed by which an object in its 
visual field is growing and this information is directly implemented into one of two beha-
viours: flight or no flight/landing. If it is flying and an object is growing more and more rap-
idly in its visual field it will elicit a landing behaviour, if it is stationary and an object is grow-
ing in its visual field it will take flight. (Marr, 1982) There is probably a bit more to it (like 
flying towards more light areas and so forth), but this is the basic plan for how the fly's visual 
system works. Other behaviours are mediated by chemical perception.
1.4.2 Vision for perception
Vision for perception is the kind of vision that we experience and readily think of when con-
sidering vision, and might not need any more explanation. However there are a couple of feats 
that must be accomplished by the visual system in order for visual perception to be of any use 
to the organism (actually there are lots of them, but I will only review some that are relevant 
to this thesis). 
First of all it must organize the informational input. What reaches the eye is an array of 
light of different wavelengths at different points. It is up to the visual system to analyse this 
mass of almost intelligible information and parse it into meaningful components that it would 
make sense to identify.  In the identification of objects,  the system must match the visual 
object to conceptual information already present in memory. This whole process is extremely 
complex, considering that the visual system must be able to recognize an object based on vir-
tually an infinite number of different retinal projections. An object can be perceived from this 
angle or that, in daylight or in lamplight, from close or afar, through a keyhole, on a photo-
graph, half hidden behind uncle Tom, covered in soot and so on (examples inspired by Mil-
likan). The retinal projection from an object in the world will probably never be exactly the 
same at two different points in time, and still the visual system can recognize the object. It 
must also be able to track the object as being the same object, even though the projection from 
the object changes due to saccades, head movements, body movements, object movements, 
light condition changes etc. The object can also change its actual shape – while walking the 
human body changes its shape constantly. Even though this is the case we don't perceive any 
change in the identity of objects – our visual systems achieves object constancy. I will argue 
that in order to do this, the visual system needs to code the visual information in scene- and/or 
object-relative coordinates, what is called allocentric coordinates. I will return to this shortly.
In contrast to the visuomotor system, the perception system also needs to remember parts 
of the scene that is not presently in focus. The eyes can only focus on one object or even on 
one part of an object at a time, and the construction of the whole scene or object is a patch-
work of different focus points over time, with input and guidance from memories and expect-
ations. While the visuomotor system works on-line with low resolution information from the 
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whole retina, the perception system uses mainly the high resolution colour information from 
the fovea. This is why it is easy to direct actions at objects in the visual periphery, but much 
harder to identify them.
1.5 Allocentric versus egocentric frames of reference
The notion that visual information can be processed according to different frames of reference 
is the most central to this thesis. There is a good deal of evidence suggesting that the cortical 
visual streams can be classified according to what frame of reference is utilized. Two basic 
frames of reference are discussed in the literature: allocentric and egocentric. 
In an egocentric frame of reference the visual information is coded in relation to some 
point on the perceiver. It could be relative the perceiver's body as a whole, the head, the eye, 
the retina, the hand or any other part of the body that is relevant for the processing of the 
visual information. In an allocentric frame of reference, the information is processed in rela-
tion to the object itself, or some point of the object (an object-centred frame of reference), or 
in relation to some other position in the objects environment (an environment-centred frame 
of reference).
For visuomotor transformation the processing must be done within an egocentric frame of 
reference (e.g. Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Goodale & Milner, 1992; Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005), 
since it is the objects relation to the agent that is critical for a successful motor action. The 
objects relation to other objects or its environment is normally not important for acting upon 
the object, so an allocentric frame of reference would be of no use to visuomotor transforma-
tion. Jeannerod and Jacob (2005) argue that it would be an impossible amount of work for the 
visuomotor system to code all retinal information in allocentric coordinates, as it would yield 
so many coordinates and reference points that the number of calculations would expand in an 
explosive fashion. This is assuming that the visuomotor system actually processes all retinal 
information indiscriminately and that there is no selection or focusing in the dorsal stream, 
which is what at least Jeannerod et al. believe.
In conscious perception, and specifically in object recognition, an allocentric perspective is 
needed. To be able to select and recognize an object from different angles, distances and other 
conditions from the visual information available, the visual system needs to encode the relat-
ive information of different objects. 
“Since perceptual recognition of an object must be achieved from many different  
spatial perspectives on many different occasions, it  requires encoding of visual  
information about  an object's  enduring  properties.  In  other  words,  perceptual  
recognition of an object demands that visual information about a perceived object  
matches  conceptual  information  and  knowledge  about  it  stored  in  long-term 
memory.” (Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005, p. 303) 
And since it is unreasonable to suppose that we store information about what an object 
looks like under all conceivable conditions (how could we ever learn?), this means that the 
perception system must encode information in an allocentric frame of reference to enable pro-
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cessing of object constancy. The best way to explain is through some examples.
The colour of a surface is often an important quality to be able to identify what that surface 
is, but the colour changes with the lighting conditions. It is often said that a piece of coal in 
the sunlight reflects more light than a ball of snow in the shadow4, still we perceive the first as 
black and the latter as white. This visual feat is possible because of the relation between the 
object and its surroundings. Without an allocentric frame of reference this relation would be 
lost. Similarly, size estimation is aided by the relation between object and surroundings, the 
allocentric information helping to decide whether you are seeing a horse far away or a really 
realistic toy right in front of you.
Another good example is that of face recognition. Almost all faces consist of the same fea-
tures with very little variation in absolute terms (nobody has a giant eye in the middle of the 
chin, or two noses etc.). Without being able to process the proportions and relations of those 
features, face recognition would be a very hard task indeed. It has been argued that the human 
brain (and perhaps also other primates brains) have a special centre or module for face recog-
nition. The  question is not settled, but if there is such a module it would most likely be part of  
the ventral stream and it would certainly process the visual information in allocentric coordin-
ates.
The  allocentric  perspective  can  also  be  argued  to  be  necessary  for  object  recognition 
because it allows the processing of different parts of an object relative to each other, which of 
course would be crucial to recognizing that object. This hypothesis rests on the assumption 
that the object recognition system does not represent objects in a holistic manner, but rather 
the different features of objects and their relations to each other, which is what the research 
suggests (Tanifuji et al., 2005).
According to the GM model, this would place allocentric processing in the ventral stream 
and egocentric processing in the dorsal stream. There is at least one study that claims that this 
could actually be the main basic division of function between the two streams. Schenk (2006) 
found that a patient with severe damage to the ventral stream showed impaired performance 
on tasks requiring allocentric processing, whereas her performance on tasks requiring ego-
centric processing was normal. An interesting note is that the patient (known as DF in the lit-
erature) was actually the same person that GM did much of their research on. So there is good 
reason to suppose that the ventral stream codes visual information in an allocentric frame of 
reference, and the dorsal stream in a egocentric frame of reference. This would also be com-
patible with Jeannerods model, however Creem and Proffitt (2001) indicates that while there 
surely is allocentric processing in the ventral stream, this could also be the case in the inferior 
dorsal stream. However, they present no direct evidence that this is the case, only that it could 
be. Zaehle et al. (2007) provide evidence that the processing of allocentric and egocentric spa-
tial information is done in it least partly separated neural networks. Summing up, the evidence 
seems to suggest that the dorsal stream process information in an egocentric frame of refer-
ence and the ventral stream in an allocentric frame of reference, but it is possible that there is 
a little of both going in the dorsal stream.
4 I am not sure whether this is true though. But it seems plausible, and while it might be false it still illustrates 
the point.
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1.6 Methods for studying the two streams hypothesis
Research of the two visual streams has been done by a lot of different means. Up until circa 
the 1990's lesion studies with monkeys (or other animals) was quite common, and the first 
evidence  for  the  hypothesis  came  from  Ungerleider  and  Mishkins  lesion  studies  with 
macaques in 1982. While this kind of research provides very good control for the scientist and 
therefore relatively reliable and clear results, it is a hurtful and indecent way of conducting 
research and the hurt done to the animals can in my opinion never be justified by any results. 
Invasive animal research should never be performed unless there is absolutely no other way 
getting important results that benefits humans or other animals in a significant way. This line 
of research does not fit either bill, since there are both other methods and the results are not 
vital for our quality of life.
Today there are brain scanning techniques available that weren't feasible thirty years ago, 
and while it is very hard to use most of them on any other primates than humans it can to a 
certain  degree provide  the same information as invasive techniques.  Brain scanning tech-
niques are also more economic, faster and can supply more detailed data. Another technolo-
gical advancement that has not yet been used in this field (to the best of my knowledge) is 
eye-tracking, through which it should be possible to study eye movements during different 
tasks. It would be interesting to see how the patterns of eye movement differ when identifying 
objects from the patterns when performing object related actions, as this could possibly tell us 
important things about what information is needed, in what order and how fast it can be pro-
cessed.
1.6.1 Patient studies
The evidence for Goodale and Milners model came first and foremost from double dissoci-
ations in patients with brain lesions affecting either stream. Patients with lesions in the ventral 
stream  suffer  from  what  is  called  visual  form  agnosia  (or  just  visual  agnosia),  and  are 
impaired in recognition and identification tasks, but can interact motorically in a normal way 
with the objects which they cannot identify. Conversely patients with lesions in the dorsal 
stream are impaired in their physical interaction with objects which they have no problem 
recognizing and identifying, a condition called optic ataxia (e.g. Goodale & Milner, 1992; 
Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005; Milner & Goodale, 2008). Visual agnosia is not to be confused with 
associative agnosia, in which the patient is able to consciously see the object but still unable 
to identify what the object is, even though they can describe features of the object accurately. 
In visual agnosia the patients vision of the object is impaired, but the patient is still able to 
identify objects from descriptions or through the other senses.
Patients that are suitable subject for researching such double dissociations are very rare, as 
pure visual agnosia requires the patient to have damage in both left and right ventral streams 
but no damage to the dorsal stream, and the opposite for optic ataxia. One such patient that 
has been well described in the literature, is known as DF. She suffers from visual agnosia fol-
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lowing carbon monoxide poisoning, that damaged both ventral streams but left the rest of her 
cortex fairly intact. DF is described as completely unable to recognize shape, size and orienta-
tion of objects and not surprisingly she is also unable to identify objects visually. If she is 
allowed to touch the objects with her hands she can identify them and describe their features 
as well as anyone could by means of tactile interaction, showing that it cannot be associative 
agnosia. When DF is instructed to reach out and grasp objects, her movements are described 
as strikingly accurate, in terms of both arm movements and grip scaling, showing that her 
visuomotor transformation is intact (e.g. Goodale & Milner, 1992).
One of the problems with using patients with brain lesions for research is that the damages 
are rarely localized to only the areas that are of interest to the researchers. There is often more 
diffuse and collateral damage, and damage in one area can very well impair the functioning of 
another area because of interconnection. Experiments with non-impaired subjects is therefore 
of great importance to corroborate the evidence from patient studies.
1.6.2 Optical illusions
It  has been posited that experiments with optical  illusions can show the separation of the 
visual system in intact brains. Certain optical illusions deceive the visual system because of 
the relations between the different parts of the illusions, and this should mean that if  the 
action-perception model is correct such visual illusions should not affect visuomotor trans-
formation in the dorsal  stream, as this is  done in egocentric coordinates.  Allocentric pro-
cessing on the other hand should be tricked by this kind of illusions. 
Experiments have been done with for instance the Ebbinghaus illusion where two identical 
circles seem to be of different sizes because of their surroundings (see Figure 2). According to 
the action-perception model this illusion should trick conscious perception of the circles, but 
not actions aimed at the same circles. If the subject is instructed to 'grasp' two circles of sizes 
that match the perceived sizes of the circles in the illusion, approaching grip size will reflect 
the  difference,  but  if  the  subject  is  instructed  to  'grasp'  the  centre  circles  in  the  illusion, 
approaching grip size should not vary according to the illusion effect. As a contrast, if the sub-
ject is instructed to estimate an appropriate grip size without directing an action at the actual 
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Figure 2: The Ebbinghaus illusion.
circles this grip size should reflect the effect of the illusion. Most experiments have confirmed 
the hypothesis, but there are some that have contended that these results are not conclusive as 
the  outer  circles  could  act  like  obstacles  affecting  grip  size  in  grasping  actions  (see  for 
instance Milner & Goodale, 2008, for a review of such experiments). 
Also predicted from the model is that if a delay is introduced between presentation of the 
stimulus and the time when the subject is required to act on the stimulus, visual memory of 
the figure can interfere with the direct processing in the dorsal stream, thus making the action 
subject to the illusory effect. If the subject is presented with the illusion and the illusion is 
then removed, requiring the subject to pretend to grasp the circle, this action will be guided by 
visual memory alone and is therefore affected by the illusion.
Several  other  visual  illusions  have  been  used  in  similar  experiments  (for  instance  the 
Müller-Lyer  and  Ponzo  illusions),  and  most  experiments  seem to  support  the  hypothesis. 
However not all optical illusions should show this pattern, as some illusions arise prior to the 
stream separation of the visual cortex and should therefore affect processing in both streams 
(e.g. Milner & Dyde, 2003).
1.7 Other approaches to the two visual systems
The action-perception model had a profound effect on the research field of human (and prim-
ate) vision, however the great impact of the 'what' and 'where' model can still be discerned. 
Most scientists have accepted the main premise of the action-perception model – that vision 
serves two purposes in primates and that this is reflected in the neuroanatomical organization 
of the cortical visual system. There are still those who maintain the UM model, as well as 
some completely  different  suggestions,  for  instance  Rossetti  and  colleagues  (in  Milner  & 
Goodale, 2008) that argue against both models, stating that the evidence cannot support either 
and propose that the functional division might actually be for processing peripheral and cent-
ral vision. During the last ten years, there have been research that indicates a possible union of  
the UM and GM models, with both 'where' and 'how' in the dorsal stream, as well as sugges-
tions of further subdivision of the visual system into three or even more streams. I will review 
two of the more interesting proposals.
1.7.1 Semantic and pragmatic processing
Jeannerod et al. (e.g. 2005), have proposed a model that is quite similar to the action-percep-
tion model, but argue that the GM model seriously underestimates the complexity of visual 
cognition, and that merely matching perception and action onto the two visual streams is not 
enough to model the cortical processing of visual information. Their suggestion is a model 
with emphasis on interaction between the two streams, and that the streams can be further 
subdivided into parts with different functions. However, they are in agreement with GM about 
the  two  main  functions  of  the  visual  system  in  primates  using  their  own  terminology: 
'semantic'  processing  for  object  recognition,  and  'pragmatic'  processing  that  uses  visual 
information for programming motor function. The purposes of the two kinds of processing are 
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largely similar to the action-perception model, but they are distributed over both streams. 
To me, it seems that Jeannerod et al. and GM are not really talking about the same thing 
when they speak about action and perception and visual systems. For GM, action and percep-
tion are the terms used to describe the functions of the neurological streams in visual cortex, 
whereas Jeannerod et al. are interested in knowing the full picture of how vision for action 
and vision for perception are actually achieved. There is not necessarily a complete correla-
tion between the two models. The systems that Jeannerod is interested in are more functional, 
encompassing different parts of the cortex and possibly a longer chain of cortical interaction. 
What GM mean by visual systems are the actual distinct neurological streams. As a result of 
this it might seem that their respective models are more incompatible than might actually be 
the case. However there are significant differences about the actual localization of function as 
well, as Jeannerod et al. much like UM places spatial processing in the dorsal stream, whereas 
GM argue that spatial processing is performed in both streams, but for different purposes and 
therefore in different ways.
An intriguing idea in Jeannerod et al.'s model is that human visual cognition makes use of 
several different kinds of visual representations and that there needs to be separate visual sys-
tems to accommodate each kind of representation. They propose that these visual systems are 
distributed over the visual streams, with substantial interaction and also lateralisation of func-
tion.  However,  they explicitly  state that  at  least  two of these kinds  of representations are 
unique  to  humans (Jeannerod & Jacob,  2005)  which  would  also  make the  corresponding 
visual systems unique to humans. I have not been able to find any evidence supporting this 
claim, and at present this makes their model unfit to serve as the basis for this thesis even 
though the more elaborate subdivision of the visual system is an attractive idea to serve as a 
basis for comparative studies.
1.7.2 Three visual systems
It is certainly implied in the Jeannerod model, but it is spelled out in a proposal made by 
Creem and Proffitt (2001), that there might in fact not be just two cortical visual systems, but 
actually three5. The proposal can be regarded as an integration of the UM and GM model, and 
asserts that the dorsal stream might in fact be two streams encompassing respectively 'where' 
and 'how'. Jeannerods model also places spatial processing in the dorsal stream, but neither 
Jeannerod nor Creem and Proffitt declare definitively whether this means that there is no spa-
tial processing at all in the ventral stream, as is the case in the UM model. Creem and Proffitt 
suggest that the dorsal stream can be divided into a superior (upper) and inferior (lower) part, 
with the superior stream subserving visuomotor transformation ('how') and the inferior hand-
ling spatial processing ('where'). They also present some evidence that points to a lateralisa-
5 Actually Jeannerod and Jacob (2005) suggests a functional division of even more areas in the dorsal stream, 
but are unclear to whether these parts are to be considered as modules in their own right or as components of 
a consolidated dorsal stream. However, their main idea is that the visual system has to principal functions and 
that these functions can be divided into a number of subfunctions that are implemented by a number of areas 
located in both streams.
19
tion of spatial processing to the right hemisphere, a lateralisation also suggested by Jeannerod 
and Jacob (2005).
1.8 Interaction between the dorsal and ventral streams
The divide of vision into the two cortical streams is a neuroanatomical fact. Regarding func-
tionality there is good evidence for the basic division into action and perception, even though, 
as Jeannerod and Jacob stress (2005), this is likely to be an oversimplification. In normal situ-
ations there is of course no real need to separate the two functions, as we use both simultan-
eously and in an intertwined fashion; There is considerable crosstalk between the two streams, 
and other cortical areas get input from both. Much of the evidence for the division comes 
from cases where one stream has been compromised, and the subject is left with only one kind 
of visual processing, resulting in optic ataxia or visual agnosia depending on which stream it 
is. In non-impaired vision, both streams are likely to be used in all kinds of situations, though 
not to the same degree (Goodale & Humphrey, 1998).
Perception provides both foundation for choice of actions as well as information that is rel-
evant for the completion of actions, and is highly relevant for all action. Likewise, vision-for-
action is likely to affect the perceptual system as our actions in the world is likely to affect our 
perception of the world (see for instance Milner, 1998). Jeannerod and Jacob (2005, p. 311) 
goes so far as to say: “Not only is what one can do shaped by what one perceives, but also 
conversely what one can do shapes what one can perceive.” The word 'shape' is of course 
quite vague, but from this quote you can get the impression that what one can see influences 
what one can do in an equal amount compared to the opposite. This seems rather questionable 
to me, as perceiving will surely be more important for acting than the other way around. If I 
were to become paralysed, surely this would not influence my ability to perceive the world in 
a comparable amount to how much my ability to act in the world would be impaired by the 
loss of conscious perception.  On the other hand, in an evolutionary perspective,  what the 
organisms have been able to do have probably had an effect on the evolution of the visual sys-
tem,  as  the visual  system ultimately is  in  the service of  behaviour whether it  be directly 
through visuomotor transformation or by means of conscious perception.
1.9 Lateralisation of processing
I will digress for a moment to consider an interesting issue that I have found no real discus-
sion of in the literature, though it intrigues me. It is commonly called the 'two cortical streams 
of visual processing', but this is really a somewhat one-sided description, as the brain has two 
hemispheres, each with its own dorsal and ventral streams. The lateralisation of these streams 
is just as much a neuroanatomical division as the separation of the dorsal and the ventral in 
one hemisphere. There is considerable crosstalk between the ventral and the dorsal, but less is 
known about the communication between the left and right streams. There is bound to be 
communication via the corpus callosum, but I've found very little information on the nature of 
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this communication. Studies with split brain patients could perhaps illuminate this matter.
Creem and Proffitt (2001) and Jeannerod and Jacob (2005) have written briefly about later-
alisation in the dorsal stream, where they notice a tendency that spatial processing might be 
localized in the right inferior parietal cortex. Jeannerod and Jacob also have some additional 
ideas about lateralisation in the dorsal stream, but nothing is said about the ventral stream. 
This is actually quite puzzling. 
Lateralisation in visuomotor transformation makes sense, as motor control of the left side 
of the body is separated from control of the right right side. It would also make sense to code 
the left versus the right visual field separately. However it is not so clear that this would be the 
case for visual perception in the ventral stream. There is no need to separate the right from left  
visual field when identifying objects, and the conscious experience of seeing is unified. So 
how is this unification achieved and what does the left versus the right ventral stream do? 
Both ventral streams seems to get input originating in both visual fields, so the question is 
what difference there is in the processing of such information. Perhaps it is a segregation of 
left and right side of the perceiver, with the left side processing information about objects to 
the right of the perceiver and vice versa, even though information for both fields is available. 
But this really begs the questions why then there is no segregation of informational input, and 
where and how objects that are right in front of the perceiver are processed.
It could be that the left and right ventral streams processes information about one side of 
objects each regardless of the availability of information. But that leaves the questions of why 
there should exist such a division and how and where the unification is achieved. Object iden-
tification has no obvious benefit from left-right segregation, and the fact that mainly foveal 
information is used would further make such a segregation unlikely. There are cases of unilat-
eral neglect where the patient is oblivious of one side of objects (typically the left), which 
possibly could support such a hypothesis, but the leading theory about neglect states that it 
generally is caused by lesions in the parietal or frontal cortex, and that it is a deficit in atten-
tion, rather than in perceptual processing (Gazzaniga et al., 2009). This would mean that the 
problem is not in the ventral stream itself, but in what information reaches consciousness. 
There is evidence that even though the patient does not become aware of information in the 
neglected side, the information is processed and can influence judgement unbeknownst to the 
patient.
Another alternative is to suppose that the left and the right ventral streams process for dif-
ferent aspects of visual processing. The left hemisphere of the brain is generally associated 
with semantics (language) and details, while the right side is more important for patterns and 
understanding the gist of things. If this (rather simplified) account of the division of propensit-
ies for different tasks is applied to the visual system as well, there are some quite interesting 
and testable hypotheses that could be made. Alas, it is not the aim of this thesis, but the ques-
tion is an interesting one and merits further investigation.
1.10 Summary
While most of the different models that have been proposed within the research field of the 
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two visual systems framework are focused on defining more or less exclusive functions for 
the two visual streams, two research teams stand out. On the one hand we have Jeannerod et 
al. that believe that there are two or more visual systems in the primate brain, but that these 
systems are not strictly related to the neuroanatomical structure of the cortex, but are derivat-
ives of the overall functioning of the whole visual cortex. On the other hand Creem and Prof-
fitt propose three main visual systems in what could be described as a compromise between 
the two most influential two visual systems models, UM and GM. The following table is a 
schematic summary of the different models that have been reviewed above.
Ventral Dorsal
Ungerleider & 
Mishkin
what where
Goodale & Milner what how
Rossetti et al. central peripheral
Schenk allocentric egocentric
Jeannerod et al. semantic pragmatic
Creem & Proffitt what where how
Table 1: Overview of the different models reviewed in this thesis.
There is one thing that most researchers today agree on, and that is that primate vision 
serves two main functions for the organism: vision for conscious perception (vision for per-
ception in GM's model or semantic processing in Jeannerods model), and vision for regulation 
of motor behaviour (vision for action in GM's model, and pragmatic processing in Jeannerods 
model). Vision of the latter kind is also agreed to be a function that most organisms with vis-
ion have6, whereas vision for perception is held to be a less common function. The neurolo-
gical evidence suggests that if it is present in animals other than primates, it has evolved sep-
arately. 
There is much evidence that conscious perception is associated with the ventral stream, and 
likewise is visuomotor transformation linked to the dorsal stream. And while it is reasonable 
to assume that Jeannerod and Jacob are correct when they say that visual cognition is far more 
complex than this, there stills seems to be a great deal of merit to this simple divide. It might 
perhaps be that visual perception is achieved in the ventral stream, but that processing in the 
dorsal stream can add to this function, like my coffee maker helps in heating up my house 
even though I would not take this to be its function (and I would certainly not go out and buy 
6 There might be organisms that have vision solely for other purposes, for instance for synchronizing circadian 
rhythm to daylight cycles.
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forty coffee makers to get through the winter). One thing seems certain and that is that there 
seems to be no chance of conscious perception without a functional ventral stream (Milner & 
Goodale, 2008). Using visual information for guiding motor behaviour is of course possible 
without a functional dorsal stream, but it becomes slow, inefficient and prone to error as it 
must pass through the ventral stream first and demands conscious attention to be successful.
The integrative use of processing in both streams is bound to have synergistic effects on 
visual cognition as a whole. There is known to be considerable crosstalk between the two 
streams and there is no reason to suppose that the rest of the associative cortex cannot use 
informational output from both systems. Because of this, I see no reason that not both GM 
and Jeannerod can be right about the essential principles of their models. For the purposes of 
the following ethological analysis I will adhere to GM's basic model, even though I believe it 
is far from settled that it is correct. At present it is the model with the most convincing sci-
entific support, and it is also more parsimonious than other proposed models.
So  even though  it  is  still  unresolved  exactly  how and  where  allocentric  perception  is 
achieved, at present the evidence favours the ventral stream.
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PART 2
Allocentric perception in primates
2.1 Introduction
There have been speculations that processing of visual information in allocentric coordinates 
might not be possible for all primates, and it is a valid question since there does not seem to 
exist any integrative study that supports or invalidates such a hypothesis. Three main lines of 
research are integral to answer this question: research on the evolution of primate cognition, 
research on the neuroanatomy of primate visual systems and experimental and ethological 
studies of primate behaviour, all of which have some degree of overlap. I will argue that allo-
centric perception need not be an all or nothing question – few abilities are. There might be 
differences in degrees or it is possible that different kinds or areas of allocentric processing 
can be identified, and that not all the various species have developed all kinds. For instance 
there could be different levels of how fast or how elaborate such processing can be done, or 
allocentric processing of objects (or specific objects like faces) but not for whole scenes etc. 
The present thesis cannot answer any such questions with any emprical data, but will give 
suggestions for how to think about these matters and possible future research strategies.
Allocentric processing has probably evolved in the primate lineage and it should therefore 
be possible to study this evolution to some extent. The evolution of the trait would most likely 
be closely tied to any discernible degrees or areas of such processing. Analysis of skills and 
behaviours of different species of primates could thus give an account of the evolutionary his-
tory of the perceptual system, according to how the primate species are historically related, 
something which is called a cladistic analysis. As the behavioural data that I have available 
are not enough to support any specific claims about such evolution I will mainly present a 
model for how this research could progress, as well as some speculation based on the data that  
is available.
2.2 Primate taxonomy
In order to investigate the evolution of a cognitive trait (or any trait for that matter) you need 
to know the evolutionary history and kinship of the species with that trait. For the purposes of 
this thesis it is necessary to be familiar with the primate lineage. While this is perhaps com-
mon knowledge to a certain extent, there might be a need to review this taxonomy.
Classification of animals into taxa is not a simple thing, since there are many things to 
account for and you could have different reasons and uses for the classifications. Creating a 
taxonomy that reliably reflects actual historical kinship requires that all available knowledge 
and methods be used. Genetics, zoology, osteology, geology, ethology and chemistry are the 
most important research fields that contribute to this enormous task. As could be expected 
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there are is no classification that is universally agreed upon by all or even a majority of all sci -
entists, but much of the basic structure is pretty solid. Regarding the order of primates there 
are naturally some different suggestions, but I will stick to the most common classification 
and not really go into the details since the differences are small and not of any major import-
ance to my work (see for instance Dawkins (2004), Begun (2004), Ross & Martin (2007)).
The biological order of Primates is divided into two suborders, Strepsirrhini (e.g. lemurs) 
and Haplorrhini (or Anthropoidea), and the later group is further divided into Tarsiiformes and 
Simiiformes. The group Simiiformes contains monkeys and apes and is the order with which 
this thesis is  concerned.  Research on primate cognition has mainly been done within this 
group, and even though much of our knowledge from this research might be extendible to the 
rest of the primate order, one should only do so with caution. If one is picky, many instances 
of the word primate in this paper should read simiiformes or simians, but it seems that a com-
mon practice is to refer to this group simply as primates. I too will follow this convention 
(since primate is a much more familiar and graceful sounding word than simiiformes) except 
in cases where it is important to separate the simians from other primates. The simians are 
sometimes referred to as “higher primates”, and even though I find this term a bit misleading 
(altitude has got very little to do with these matters), I find it quite useful to give the text more 
flow.
Regarding the neglected primate species (tarsiers, lemurs etc.), the applicable research is 
extremely scarce. These animals are in many ways substantially different from the higher 
primates and even in the absence of much research it is probably safe to assume that much of 
their perceptual and cognitive systems lack the complexity that is distinctive of the higher 
primates (Kaas, 2005).
The infraorder of simians is further divided into Platyrrhini, that consists of New World 
monkeys,  and  Catarrhini  encompassing  Old  World  monkeys  (Cercopithecoidea)  and  apes 
(Hominoidea). Apes can be further  sub categorized into gibbons that are also known as lesser 
apes (family Hylobatidae), and great apes (family Hominidae) which includes humans. This 
nomenclature is not universally agreed upon, some would for instance not place humans in the 
same family as other great apes, but rather have a separate family just for our species. I will 
follow the former classification  as  it  makes  more  sense from a cladistic  perspective.  For 
instance chimpanzees and humans are more closely related than chimpanzees and gorillas in 
terms of when the last common ancestors lived (by a million years or so), and this makes the 
latter kind of classification less tenable (Dawkins, 2004). The family of great apes consist of 
humans (Homo), chimpanzees (Pan), gorillas (Gorilla) and orang-utans (Pongo). Except for 
Homo that only consist of one extant species, multiple species are recognized in each of these 
genera today.
25
                      Primates Order
                  Anthropoidea Strepsirrhini   Suborder
Simiiformes Tarsiiformes* Lemuriformes* Lorisiformes* Infraorder
Platyrrhini* Catarrhini Parvorder
Figure 3: The orders of primates. Created from Dawkins (2004), primate (2009) In Encyclopædia Britannica  
Online, Ross & Martin (2007). *Further subdivision omitted.
                                  Catarrhini Parvorder
                                  Hominoidea Cercopthecoidea* Superfamily
                        Hominidae Hylobatidae Family
   Homininae Ponginae Subfamily
Homo Pan Gorilla Pongo Hylobates Genera
Figure 4: The families of Catarrhini. Created from Dawkins (2004), primate (2009) In Encyclopædia Britannica 
Online, Ross & Martin (2007). *Further subdivision into different genera of Old World monkeys omitted.
2.3 Primate cladistics
The research on the cognitive skills of primates is not evenly distributed among the different 
species. After humans, the most studied species are the chimpanzees. There is significantly 
less  research on gorillas  and orang-utans,  and gibbons have been the  focus  of very little 
research thus far. There are more than ten different species of gibbons and over a hundred spe-
cies of Old World monkeys as well  as about  a hundred species of New World monkeys. 
Among monkeys there is a significant amount of research on both Old World and New World 
monkeys, but most of it is restricted to only a few species. For a research model it is not feas-
ible to do research on all these species, and there needs to be a grouping of species to make it 
practical and useful, therefore a select few species have been treated as representatives of their  
families. For the model I will propose I will adhere to this tradition, and have made a group-
ing according to the following table (table 2).
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Group Species
Humans Homo sapiens
Chimpanzees
Pan troglodytes
Pan paniscus
Gorillas
Gorilla gorilla
Gorilla beringei
Orang-utans
Pongo pygmaeus
Pongo abelii
Gibbons
All species of 
Hylobatidae
Old World monkeys
All species of 
Cercopithecidae
New World monkeys
All species of
Platyrrhini
Table 2: Functional groupings that will be 
used in the research model.
This grouping is the cladistic grouping that emerges if the human ancestry is traced back-
wards along a line of ancestors. Every group of species shares a (in principle) single common 
ancestor with humans at some point in history. A group with a common ancestor is called a 
clade. This means that the genera Homo and Pan constitutes a common clade as well as being 
two separate  clades,  and the  whole order  of  primates  is  also a  clade.  Tracing back from 
humans through the primate lineage and plotting the different branches of the extant clades 
would produce these groupings. There is fairly reliable information of when the last common 
ancestors (LCA) of every branch lived, and this information can be used to get an idea of 
when traits are likely to have evolved. The following schematic shows estimations of when 
the LCA of humans and the other primate clades considered in this thesis lived.
NW Monkeys OW Monkeys Gibbons Orang-utans Gorillas Chimpanzees Humans
Figure 3: Timeline of when the last common ancestors of the different primate groups lived. The numbers are  
approximations. Mya = Million years ago. The figure is not to scale, and distances should not be understood as  
representing anything. Created from Glazko & Nei (2003).
The main idea for appraising the evolution of cognitive or other traits is that if it is present 
in all (or most) species within a clade, then it is most likely that their common ancestor also 
had that trait. If the trait is only present in a minority of the species within the clade, then it is 
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6 Mya
7 Mya
13 Mya
15 Mya
25 Mya40 Mya
likely that their LCA did not have the trait. Knowing when the LCA's of the different clades 
lived makes it possible to estimate the time period during which a certain trait evolved or dis-
appeared.
I  will  illustrate  with  some different  examples.  Within  the  primate  clade,  only  humans 
exhibit spoken language so it is therefore likely that this trait has evolved after the last LCA of  
chimpanzees and humans, that is less than six million years ago (and probably more recently). 
Or an example related to vision: Trichromatism is present in virtually all Old World monkeys 
and apes, but not in New World monkeys or other primates, which makes it most likely that 
this trait evolved somewhere between the LCA of New World monkeys and the LCA of all 
other anthropoidea, meaning that it evolved between 40 and 25 million years ago. Almost all 
monkeys have tails, and even though no apes have them this makes it likely that the common 
ancestor of all anthropoidea had tails since most other primates also have tails, placing the 
loss of the tail somewhere between the LCA of Old World monkeys and the LCA of apes.
2.4 Evolution of the primate visual cortex
The primate visual cortex consists of a large number of areas that are unique to primates, and 
the human cortex seems to be the one with the most number of differentiated areas. This is not 
very surprising considering the fact that the human brain is larger relative to all other primate 
species with more room for such differentiation. Areas V1 and V2 are present in most mam-
mals, but so far there is no evidence of the existence of area V3 or any of the visual areas des-
ignated with numbers in humans in any other mammal than primates (Kaas, 2005). Some of 
the more caudal visual areas, like V3, are likely to have evolved with the first primates as they 
are present in all studied primate species. In early primates there was an expansion of the 
visual cortex, especially in the temporal lobe, and in the anthropoids there was an even greater 
expansion with addition of numerous visual areas (Kaas, 2005). It is believed that early prim-
ates where nocturnal, which makes it likely that these animals, like their closest ancestors, 
used olfaction as their primary sensory system. The switch to vision as primary sensory sys-
tem is  likely to have co-occurred with or happened after  primates became diurnal,  but  it 
makes sense to speculate that some development of the visual system preceded and perhaps 
even was a factor in initiating the switch from night to day living.
New World monkeys stand out from the other primates considered in this thesis. In many 
respects, their sensory faculties are less like the rest of the anthropoidea, but more like those 
of other mammals. For example, New World monkeys are dichromates and use olfaction as 
the primary sensory system for a number of functions (including social functions), which is 
typical for most other mammal species (primate, 2009, in Encyclopædia Britannica Online). 
The higher primates are trichromates and use olfaction to a much lower degree. Trichromat-
ism allows for more extensive colour vision, which in turn makes the visual system more 
sensitive to finer details. Not much is known about the differences in visual cortex organiza-
tion between New World and Old World monkeys, but “a number of differences seem likely,  
given their long, separate evolutionary history” (Kaas, 2005, p. 277).
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“[T]he origins of vision may be related more to its contribution to the control of  
action than to its role in conscious perception, a function which appears to be a  
relative newcomer on the evolutionary scene” (Goodale & Humphrey, 1998, p. 
183). 
There  is  a  great  deal  of  evidence  that  visuomotor  transformation  is  something  that  is 
present in all vertebrates with vision. This makes it likely that the dorsal stream that performs 
this function in primates is either an old evolutionary structure or a development from such a 
structure (Goodale & Milner, 1992). The primitive vertebrates in which vision evolved had no 
cortex, so visuomotor transformation must have been implemented by more primitive brain 
circuits. In extant species without cortex but with visual guidance of action, this is achieved in 
the mesencephalon and other parts of the brain stem. Such visual systems are assumed to con-
sist of specialized modules that control specific motor outputs in response to innately spe-
cified stimuli (Goodale & Humphrey, 1998; Sewards & Sewards, 2002). Subcortical struc-
tures still play a role in vision in mammals, including humans, but the emergence of a visual 
cortex has allowed for more complex visual processing and mediation of a wider behavioural 
repertoire.
The ventral stream can only be found in primates, which would make it a much later evolu -
tionary development. Primates seem to be the only animals that can encode visual information 
in allocentric coordinates (Zaehle et al., 2006), which would make primates the only animals 
capable of true object identification through vision.7 Many animals can of course react select-
ively to objects giving the impression of being able to identify objects by means of vision, but 
there are good reasons to believe that this is not by means of conscious visual perception of 
the objects (Sewards & Sewards, 2002). Goodale and Humphrey (2008) sees the emergence 
of the new organization and features in the primate visual system as a result of pressure from 
more complex cognitive and social behaviours, but give no indication as to why they believe 
this was the direction of causation. I would like to emphasize that it could just as easily be the 
other way around, that the more capable visual system allows for more complex cognitive and 
social behaviour, or even more probably that more complex behaviour and more capable vis-
ion evolved together, providing pressure and possibilities in both directions. In the last part of 
this thesis I will discuss this topic at more length.
There seems to be some kind of scaling in how complex and differentiated the visual cor-
tex is, from certain New World monkeys that has the least convoluted cortices of the studied 
species, to the apes that have the most complex with the apex in human cortex (Kaas, 2005). 
This might not be all too surprising, considering that the same rough pattern can be found for 
overall relative brain size, and a larger brain will have more room for additional differenti-
ation. Kaas (2005) argues that the brain of certain New World monkeys (e.g. the galago) is 
likely to be relatively similar to the brains of our ancestral primitive primates. Likewise, it is 
believed that the shared ancestor of humans and chimpanzees was much more like chimps 
than humans, a reasonable assumption considering that chimps are more similar to other apes 
than humans are (at least in terms of cognitive abilities). Since there seems to be an increase 
7 Though there are some other species that are good candidates, see next section (2.5).
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in complexity of the visual cortex that roughly follows the lineage of the primates, this could 
tell us something about the evolution of vision in primates. Humans obviously have more 
advanced cognitive capabilities than other primates, and it is reasonable to assume that spe-
cies that are more closely related to humans will also have more advanced cognition. This is 
also, in general, what the research shows. But there is cause for caution in these matters, as 
there are no hierarchies linking species to each other but only common ancestors. Every lin-
eage of species are subject to their own selectional pressures and the evolution of that lineage 
will  reflect  this,  not  the selectional pressures of any other lineage no matter  how closely 
related they are.
2.5 Allocentric perception in non-primates
The literature boldly claims that only primates have allocentric perception, but there is reason 
to pause and think a little about this claim. The literature also claims that in order to identify 
objects  through  vision,  the  animal  needs  to  process  the  visual  information  in  allocentric 
coordinates. This would mean that only primates are capable of identifying objects through 
vision. There is evidence of other animals than primates doing just that, as certain species of 
birds as well as elephants and dolphins seem to be able to recognize themselves in a mirror 
(e.g. Marino, 2004). Since the mirror image cannot supply any other kinds of information than 
visual, it seems that at least one of these statements must be wrong. Certain birds, elephants 
and dolphins engage in other activities that arguably would imply that they might both be able 
to identify objects through vision as well as processing information in allocentric coordinates 
(e.g. Clayton & Emery, 2005; Bates et al., 2008).
The coding of sensory information in allocentric coordinates can only be done with certain 
kinds of sensory information, such information that reflects the spatial configuration of the 
world. This directly disqualifies such senses as taste and touch, since taste only gives informa-
tion about that part of the world which is in the mouth and touch only about what is in contact 
with the body. In the case of hearing and smell there is a certain amount of spatial information 
that can be perceived, but arguably not enough to be processed in allocentric coordinates. 
Animals with a keen sense of smell are sensitive enough to locate the general direction from 
which a smell comes, but because of the general properties of air the smell is diffused in a 
way that prohibits any very precise such judgements of location to be made. The spatial rela-
tion between two sources of smell could not be precisely judged from even a short distance. 
Using ordinary hearing to judge the spatial properties of the world would of course be an 
impossible task as most things in the world does not make any distinctive sounds, a fact that 
also applies to smell (a hole in the ground probably smells the same as the ground).
Constructing a detailed spatial representation of the environment with preserved relations 
between constituents through hearing, smell, touch or taste seems to be a very hard task to 
accomplish.  Adding  the  identification  of  those  constituents  from  afar  makes  it  basically 
impossible. Creating such a mental representation of the world is in the case of humans done 
mainly  through vision  and memory,  with  relevant  modification  and input  from the  other 
senses. There is only one known sensory system other than vision that could in principle 
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allow for spatial perception of the kind necessary for constructing such a representation and 
that is echolocation. As echolocation also reveals the spatial configuration of the world with 
its different surfaces, it could in principle provide sensory information that could be processed 
in an allocentric frame of reference. Though judging from the behavioural repertoire of most 
echolocating animals, I suspect that it is predominantly used in a fashion similar to visuomo-
tor transformation. A possible exception could be the dolphin.
In the case of certain species of birds (mainly corvids) and dolphins, these animals show 
signs of cognitive capabilities that are similar to those of primates, and are rare or non-exist-
ent among other animals. Corvids are known to use tools, and both dolphins and certain birds 
seem to be able to discriminate among objects and solve problems with the aid of vision. 
Assuming that this is so, there are two possibilities: Either allocentric perception is not needed 
for this kind of vision, or other animals than primates process sensory information in allo-
centric coordinates. I would assume the latter. There are good arguments for why allocentric 
perception is needed for object identification, but the evidence that only primates have this 
capability is lacking. The only available evidence is that the ventral stream in which allo-
centric processing is achieved has evolved only in the primate lineage. But this is by no means 
conclusive, as allocentric processing as easily could be achieved by different and independent 
neural developments in other lineages. It is true however, that this capacity seems to have 
evolved separately in the primate from any other such visual system in any other group of 
animals. Visual perception has been studied quite extensively in several species of primates, 
but the research of the visual systems in other animals is lacking. Further research will prob-
ably show that visual systems similar in function to the ventral stream have evolved in other 
lineages as well.
2.6 Studying allocentric perception in primates
As has been mentioned, allocentric perception is not unique to man. This should be quite clear 
considering  the  fact  that  other  primates  than  humans use  vision  for  object  identification, 
which calls for coding of visual information in allocentric metrics. Haun et al. (2006) showed 
in a series of experiments that four species of apes (humans, chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-
utans) prefer an allocentric frame of reference to an egocentric when solving a spatial problem 
relying on vision. This can also be established through studying behaviours that are reliant on 
allocentric visual information. But as I've already stated, it would probably be an oversimpli-
fication to regard this question from a standpoint that posits allocentric processing to “be or 
not to be”. It would be interesting to find out if there could be levels or degrees of allocentric 
processing, or if it could be area specific. A relevant question is to enquire into to what extent 
it is integrated with other cognitive capacities. The coding of visual information in allocentric 
metrics is of course of no use if the organism cannot put that information to use. Turned on its 
head, there is probably no more allocentric processing than there needs to be in order for the 
animal to perform the actions that it performs. For reasons of developmental and energy con-
sumption economics, a system will not evolve to be more “expensive” than it needs to be. The 
larger brain area that is needed to accommodate more extensive allocentric processing leads to  
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a larger brain which typically requires a longer ontogenic developmental time, and consumes 
more energy to function. It should therefore be possible to say something about the probable 
evolution of allocentric processing from studying the distribution of skills in different primate 
species. This is the foundational idea that the following proposition rests on.
So what behaviours are relevant to study when trying to ascertain the presence of allo-
centric perception, and what behaviours can be said to pertain to what levels or areas of allo-
centric perception? To start with the second part of the question, levels can only be identified 
through the behaviours that they mediate. The conscious experience of different levels of allo-
centric perception is, as is all other conscious experience, private and inaccessible to others 
than the  experiencer.  Different  levels  of  such visual  processing  could then be  studied by 
means of brain scanning, but would still only make sense in relation to the different beha-
viours that are hypothesised to accompany these levels. This is of course a somewhat circular 
chain of inference, but so is basically all inferences at some point.
To a certain extent the behaviours that are of interest are behaviours that are, if not unique 
to, then at least characteristic of primates but non-existent or scarce in other mammals. If the 
behaviour can be argued to be conditional on allocentric perception, the behaviour should not 
be present in animals lacking this ability. However, this is a statement that needs some quali-
fying, as behaviours that seem similar need not be so. Different animals have different pheno-
types and different ecological conditions, and so two behaviours that seem similar can serve 
very different purposes, and two behaviours that seem dissimilar might in fact serve the same 
purpose (Papini, 2008). To understand the behaviours of a certain species, you must be famil-
iar with that species' biology and ecological niche.
Of course not all behaviours that are typical of, or unique to primates are served by allo-
centric perception. Many primates are adept at grasping objects with their hands and feet, 
something that few other animals do, but such a skill would be served mainly by the dorsal 
stream and in an egocentric frame of reference as we have seen. The behaviours of interest for 
studying allocentric perception should in some way or another require the perception of rela-
tions between objects (object is to be understood in a wide sense: an apple, a tool, a conspe-
cific, a tree or the ground) and/or events (any kind of phenomenon that can be perceived visu-
ally). In the next section I will present an inventory of behavioural kinds that I will argue ful-
fil these criteria.
There is no scientific evidence for any such levels of allocentric perception at present, it is 
just a suggestion for a model that could help explain the apparent expansion and diversifica-
tion of the visual cortex, and especially the ventral stream, in the primate lineage. As there is 
much evidence that humans and primate species more closely related to humans have a larger 
visual cortex with a more complex and compartmentalized organization, this begs the ques-
tion what it is used for. It could of course just be as simple as that it provides more acute vis-
ion with finer detail, but the explorations of the visual system suggests otherwise. My sugges-
tion is that the larger visual cortex is directly involved in subserving more advanced cognitive 
processes that uses visual information, with different parts of the visual system evolved to 
process information for different tasks, perhaps in a modular fashion. 
Melvyn Goodale (1998) made a good point when he said that you cannot really tell where 
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vision ends and motor control begins in the dorsal stream – there are no boundaries between a 
visual cortex and a motor cortex. I would like to make a similar point: Where does vision end 
and cognition begin? The ventral stream processes visual information and turns it into con-
scious perception and makes it available for other cognitive manipulations, such as memory, 
problem solving, reasoning etc. But where is the boundary where it ceases to be visual pro-
cessing and begins to be other cognitive processing? My answer is that there is no such point, 
as it all is part of the same overall system, evolved to solve a number of problems in order to 
facilitate survival and procreation. When we think about objects or space there is bound to be 
activation in the visual cortex, and this is of course part of thinking about such things.
The proposed method is to use behavioural data from primates and map it to certain cognit -
ive skills judged to be interconnected with allocentric visual perception. My theory is that 
primate species that are more closely related to humans and have larger and more differenti-
ated visual cortices also have a larger repertoire of cognitive skills of this kind. There should 
also be a roughly systematic increase in the distribution of skills, such that a skill shown by a 
less closely related species should also in principle be present in more closely related species. 
Obviously this might not be the case for a number of reasons that would not contradict my 
claim, but there should be some kind of discernible trend. Further, should this trend prove to 
be both clear and systematic (which I hope it will be), then there is good reason to be excited 
about it.
This presented scheme is an interim working model. To a large part it is somewhat specu-
lative, as is necessary for now as there is not enough research to support it. I am not an expert 
on primates or primate cognition or behaviour, the arrangement reflects my present know-
ledge of these matters, and it is therefore feasible that there exists scientific evidence contra-
dicting certain parts of it. Such evidence should be accumulated and incorporated into the 
model, extending and attuning it. All my suggestions might be proven wrong eventually, but it 
is a starting point. Perhaps it will not be fruitful to talk about 'levels' of allocentric processing, 
but rather modes or varieties of visual processing that also happen to be allocentric in nature. 
Perhaps all these skills rely on the same basic visual capacities.  But at present I see this way 
of framing the problem as a useful and promising model. I will also suggest some directions 
for future research that could help develop and corroborate the model, as well as research 
within the model with the purpose of extending the knowledge of the evolution of allocentric 
perception in primates.
2.6.1 Tool use
Many species of apes manufacture and use tools,  mainly for food retrieval  purposes like 
cracking open nuts, fishing for termites and such. Tool use has also been documented in many 
species of monkeys. The evidence comes form both ethological studies of wild animals and 
experimental studies with animals in captivity. There is of course no such thing as a specific 
'tool use behaviour', different tool use behaviours most certainly rely in part on different cog-
nitive abilities. The etiquette 'tool use' is a collecting term for a wide variety of behaviours 
that have in common that some kind of object is used to achieve the goals of the agent.
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There are several important aspects of primate tool use behaviour that make it a good can-
didate  for  studying  allocentric  processing.  A pivotal  part  of  using tools is  selecting what 
objects would be appropriate tools, and this requires visual processing of relational properties 
of the object itself and in relation other objects that the tool might be used with. For instance a 
stick for termite fishing has to have a certain length, be slender and straight enough etc. More 
than that, it might also have to be stripped of twigs and leaves, requiring the primate to actu-
ally manufacture the appropriate tool. The use in itself of such a stick does not require allo-
centric perception, as it can be viewed as a elongation of the arm in itself, and thus reliant on 
egocentric coordinates. However, choosing and manufacturing it cannot be done within an 
egocentric frame of reference. Modification by removing parts from an object or putting two 
or more parts together requires perception of the relations between the different parts. Some 
research indicates that certain species of primates might be able to choose appropriate tools 
that don't need modification, but are not able to modify an object into an appropriate tool (e.g. 
Call, 2000). Tool manufacture can be of two basic kinds, either removing parts of on object to 
create a tool or assembling two or more parts to create a tool. A general tendency seems to be 
that most primates are good at destroying things, but not that good at creating new things. In 
other words, tool manufacture by subtractive methods is relatively prevalent, while additive 
manufacture (combining objects) is rarer (Josep Call, personal communication).
Cracking nuts with hammer and anvil is a much more complicated procedure, requiring the 
relations between as much as four objects to be 'just so'. The nut it placed on an anvil, often a 
larger rock, and is pounded with another rock. Sometimes the anvil is supported by another 
piece of rock or  wood to  make it  more steady and level.  This means that  for successful 
assembly and use of this tool set up, allocentric coordinates are essential. The different parts 
of the arrangement could be regarded as individual tools, but I would argue that it is the com-
bination of objects that constitutes what I call a compound tool. It could be argued that this is 
a case of additive tool manufacture, but I would contend that it is not. Adding a handle to the 
hammer by attaching a stick to a rock would be additive manufacture, or joining two short 
sticks to make a long stick. Using objects together as in the hammer and anvil case is similar, 
but not the same.
This seems to indicate that there are four aspects of tool use in primates that could vary 
between species and that could be indicative of allocentric capacities: tool selection, subtract-
ive tool manufacture, additive tool manufacture and compound tool use.
2.6.2 Social and communicative skills
Many species of animals  have some means of communicating with conspecifics:  through 
sound, smell,  visual displays and other behavioural patterns. Much of this communication 
seem to have a very strong innate component, like in the case of glands that excrete commu-
nicative smells. Such communication might require the receiver to learn what different smells 
mean, but the arsenal of available messages is predetermined by the glandular system of that 
species. Many vocalizing behaviours also seem to be innate, as are visual displays for aggres-
sion, submission or presenting for procreation. In the case of primates and gesture communic-
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ation on the other hand, there is a much weaker innate component, as such communication 
varies considerably between different groups of the same species. 
Gestural communication has been widely studied among chimpanzees, and different popu-
lations can use the same gestures to communicate different things, different gestures to com-
municate the same things or any combination. Different populations also vary as to how much 
they  use  gestural  communication,  and  for  what  purposes  (Blake,  2004).  This  means  that 
though there is likely to be some innate propensity for using communicative gestures, the ges-
tures and their meaning are learned and culturally transferred. Of course gestural communica-
tion is closely tied to visual perception, but most gestures in themselves might not need any 
allocentric processing to be perceived, as it is not necessary for the animal to consciously 
identify the gesture, just react to it as a signal stimulus.
There is evidence that great apes adapt their gestures in such a way that the conspecific 
with which they want to communicate is likely to see the gesture (Povinelli et al., 2003). This 
includes making sure to be in the line of sight of the conspecific as well as paying attention 
the whether or not that individual is looking. There are two important aspects for the investig-
ation here: Firstly, the primate must be able to know what the conspecific can see from where 
that individual is situated – taking that individual's perspective. Secondly, it is a question of 
being able to see and understand whether that individual is paying attention. These aspects 
have been used in experimental studies trying to ascertain whether the chimpanzee has a the-
ory of mind or not (Call & Tomasello, 2008), raising the question about how vision and allo-
centric processing might be important for such a capacity. There is much research indicating 
that visual information about bodily postures and movements affect how humans understand 
and appraise others in very profound ways (e.g. Oberzaucher & Grammer, in press). Thus our 
visual systems clearly plays an important part in our social interaction, and it might in fact 
determine some of the foundations for such interaction.
A kind of gesture that is of particular importance in connection with allocentric perception 
is pointing. This kind of gesture concerns a relation between the sender and an object, and the 
meaning of the gesture is inherent in that relation, i.e. it is not specified through convention. 
Pointing and understanding of pointing gestures have been observed in chimpanzees (Call, 
2009, personal communication). Arguably, this kind of gesture is more relying on allocentric 
perception of the perceiver than any other kind of gesture. Similar to pointing is gaze follow-
ing, something that several primate species are clearly capable of (Tomasello et al., 1998) 
While  a  pointing  gesture  is  arguably  an  intentional  communicative  behaviour,  looking  at 
something could potentially give the same information to the perceiver, albeit unintention-
ally.8 Gaze following is very similar to what I described earlier about perspective taking and 
knowing when a conspecific is looking. But the purposes are different, in the former case it is 
necessary to know that the conspecific can perceive my communication, in the latter case it is 
used to understand something of communicative value from the conspecific. However for the 
8 This is in itself possibly communicating something different. Apart from communication the focus of atten-
tion,  the pointing gesture also communicates  the  sender's  intention for  the receiver  to  become aware  of 
whatever he's pointing to, while looking does not communicate any such information. While such informa-
tion can be perceived and be useful to humans, it is unclear whether this is so for other primates.
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purposes of my model I will treat both as the same skill, as it is likely that the visual pro-
cessing for these two skills is the same as it involves processing of identical kinds of visual 
information, i.e. head and eye positions of the conspecific.
While  pointing  and looking are  clearly  different  from the  sender's  perspective,  at  first 
glance it might look like it could be the same skill that is needed to perceive such signals. 
However there are two differences that  make it  likely that they are actually two different 
skills. Pointing is quite a clear signal that is highly visible. Even without paying much atten-
tion  to  it,  such  a  gesture  would  still  be  noticeable.  On  the  other  hand  the  direction  of 
someone's gaze is not very pronounced, and requires more selective attention to be noticed. 
This could point towards gaze following being a more difficult  task than understanding a 
pointing gesture. On the other hand, while pointing is a gesture that is quite rare among prim-
ates, and virtually non-existent among other mammals, looking at objects of interest is not. 
This information is readily available from most animals that have vision, as the direction of 
the head and eyes will always coincide with the direction of whatever that animal is looking 
at, and this means that there is a much greater chance of a skill developing for reading such 
signals from both an evolutionary perspective as well as from an individual learning perspect-
ive. Understanding of pointing gestures and gaze following will therefore be treated as two 
different skills in my model. Understanding of what another animal can see is the third skill in 
this category. It should also be noted that it need not be a conspecific that the subject can read 
this signals from, it could also be a member of another species, for instance a human as would 
be necessary in an experimental setting.
2.6.3 Causal understanding
It has been shown in experiments that some primates might be capable of understanding phys-
ical causality (e.g. Hanus & Call, 2008; Seed & Call, 2009). There are numerous experiments 
testing primates in different problem solving tasks that require the animal to use untrained 
causal clues to deduct the location of hidden food, or to reach food items from a distance.
To understand that one event causes another event you need to understand the relation 
between those two events. In the case of physical causality this is basically that one object 
causes an effect onto another object (billiard ball hitting another billiard ball causing the latter 
to move), and for this you need full allocentric processing of the individual objects and their 
relation. When causing things in the world yourself it is sufficient with an egocentric per-
spective, for instance when pushing something causing it to move. However, if the effect that 
you are after is caused indirectly by your actions, this would call for an allocentric perspect-
ive. For instance the effect of shaking a branch is that the branch moves, but doing that to 
cause fruit to fall off requires a perception of the relation between the branch and the fruit, 
hence an allocentric perspective.
I would strongly suggest that causal understanding is highly unlikely to occur without allo-
centric visual processing, that understanding the causality of the world begins in the visual 
system. Immanuel Kant proposed an idea similar to that, when he in his Critik der reinen Ver-
nunft  (1781) claimed that accounts of time, space and also causality are aspects that our cog-
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nitive systems necessarily shapes our perception of the world in. To explain the primates con-
ception of causal events  “...we need more than Humean causality, we might need at least  
some sprinkles of Kantian causality” (Josep Call, in conversation). Kant's most basic idea was 
that because the perceptual and cognitive systems shape the way we perceive the world we 
cannot really know what the world is like in itself (beyond our perception of it) and that there 
might not really be any such thing as causality in the world itself. But the idea that perception 
of time, space and causality is entirely shaped by the perceptual and cognitive systems is a 
valid point, whether or not you want to make the claim that this means that we cannot really 
know anything about the world-in-itself or not. It is likely that the different cognitive and per-
ceptual systems of different species make these species experience time, space and causality 
in different ways. The main point here is that to have an account of causality, the animal needs  
allocentric perception. I will discuss this further in the last part of this essay.
2.6.4 Sorting objects on the basis of relative size
Experimental studies have shown that chimpanzees can be taught to sort objects of different 
size in order relative to their sizes (Call, 2000), which means that they are able to compare 
objects relative to each other. To the best of my knowledge, sorting of objects on basis of 
other relations than size have not been tested. It would be interesting to see if apes that can 
sort objects in order based on relative size could also sort objects based on other visual prop-
erties or non-visual properties, like for instance weight. Sorting objects in order from smallest 
to largest might be a cognitively more challenging task than for instance sorting objects into 
groups according to similarity. It might be the case that certain animals can do the latter but 
not the former. If so, this category should be divided into two.
2.6.5 Ability to recognize relational similarity
In an experiment Daniel Haun and Josep Call (2008) tested four primate species on their abil-
ity to  infer relation between two sets  of objects  based on their  relative locations in  their 
respective groups. For instance the leftmost object in the first group is related to the leftmost 
object in the second groups etc. To solve this task the animal must be able to perceive rela-
tions between relations, firstly relating the objects within one group to each other and then 
relating the objects of the two groups to each other. Two of the species were successful in the 
task.
2.6.6 Other skills and behaviours
There are bound to be other kinds of skills that rely on allocentric perception that I will not 
consider. A very straight forward skill of this type would be the ability to identify different 
objects by means of vision. While it is assumed that all or most primates do this, and most 
other mammals don't, there could be differences in how well different species can discrimin-
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ate  different  types  of  objects  or  between  different  objects  with  similar  appearances,  for 
instance objects consisting of the same parts but with different relations between the parts. I 
have not yet had the time to look into any eventual research in this direction. There could also 
be behaviours related to orienting in an environment or other problem solving situations that 
could be illuminating for the purpose of my study. The skills that I've settled on investigating 
offer experimental data that is useful for this thesis, and are easily identifiable as relating to 
allocentric perception.
2.6.7 Skill grouping overview
The skills that have been presented can be organized into three categories. If some species 
have positive results in one category this is an indication that allocentric processing could be 
domain specific, or there could show other significant patterns of skill distribution.
Tool use Social Reasoning
Selection Pointing Causal understanding
Subtractive manufacture Gaze following Relational sorting
Additive manufacture Perspective understanding Recognizing similarity
Combinatory tool use
Table 3: Skill grouping chart.
2.7 Behavioural data
All the skills that I have described are confirmed through experimental research to be at least 
partly displayed by at least one primate species other than humans. For most of them, how-
ever, there is very little data available. Also, there seems to be a bias towards positive results. 
There are very few studies that have been published that present evidence of primate species 
lacking this ability or that, and that is of course to be expected. Much research is aimed at get-
ting positive results and proving what different species can do, studying what animals can't do 
is just not as exciting. For my purposes though, all results are results, and since negative res-
ults are quite rare they would stand out as particularly interesting. The problem with negative 
results is that you never can be sure whether they actually mean anything. If an animal has 
been able to perform an action, that means that it is possible. If it does not perform the action, 
that doesn't really mean anything more than just that. Designing experiments aimed at getting 
reliable negative results is indeed a very hard task. Comparative studies are complicated since 
experimental set ups does not necessarily translate well between different species. And using 
different set ups for different species to accommodate for this will naturally be even more 
complicated from a comparative standpoint. This problem is unavoidable, and the only way to 
deal with it is to always be very careful when interpreting results.
For reasons of space I cannot review the methods used in the experiments from which I 
have collected the data that I will present, but is is of course readily available in the literature. 
38
This is only intended to be a brief overview of some of what has been established about the 
distribution of these skills in the different primate groups. I do not claim that it is in any way a 
fair representation of the state of the research in this field, it is only a presentation of some 
data points to give an example of how this plotting is intended to work. My main effort in 
writing this thesis has gone in to the theoretical  side in reviewing the two visual streams 
research and constructing the research platform.  There is  obviously a lot  of very relevant 
research that I have not yet had the time to familiarize myself with.
Humans are just included for reference. A similar charting could also be constructed for 
use in a human developmental perspective, which would indeed be an interesting comple-
mentary study.
The fundamental idea and design for this research model is owes a great debt to the work 
of Josep Call, especially Call (2000).
2.7.1 Legend
In the following charts these codes apply (adapted from Call, 2000): 
++ convincing evidence of skill
+ some evidence of skill
+/- conflicting evidence
- negative evidence of skill
If the field is empty, it means that there is no data available. Note that a single plus sign does 
not denote that there is evidence of “weaker” skill than two plus signs, just that there is less 
evidence confirming the existence of the skill.
2.7.2 Tool use category
Selection
Subtractive 
manufacture
Additive 
manufacture
Combinatory 
tool use
Humans ++ ++ ++ ++
Chimpanzees ++ ++ +/- ++
Gorillas
Orang-utans ++ ++
Gibbons +
OW Monkeys
NW Monkeys ++ + -
Data from Byrne (2004), Call (2000), Cunningham et al. (2009), Nakamichi (2004).
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2.7.3 Social category
Pointing
Gaze 
following
Perspective 
understanding
Humans ++ ++ ++
Chimpanzees ++ ++
Gorillas
Orang-utans
Gibbons
OW Monkeys ++
NW Monkeys
Data from Call & Tomasello (2008), Tomasello et al. (1998),
2.7.4 Reasoning category
Causal 
understanding
Relational 
sorting
Recognizing 
similarity
Humans ++ ++ ++
Chimpanzees ++ ++ ++
Gorillas ++ -
Orang-utans ++ -
Gibbons
OW Monkeys
NW Monkeys
Data from Call (2000), Hanus & Call (2008), Haun & Call (2009).
2.8 On categories and modules
The three categories I have constructed here could be collapsed into two to fit with the hypo-
thesis about the evolution of the human brain that identifies three basic modules of human 
(and to a certain extent primate) cognition: folk psychology, folk biology and folk physics. 
What I have called the social category has a clear fit with the folk psychology module, and 
my other two categories could be linked to folk physics. I would hypothesize that allocentric 
vision has been a necessary prerequisite for the cognition described by all three modules, but 
there is not any readily available observational or experimental data that illuminates the role 
of vision for folk biology.
While it could have been desirable to make my model streamlined with this highly interest-
ing modules approach, and collapsing my tool and reasoning categories into a physics cat-
egory, I have chosen not to do so. This decision is driven by the literature and data presented. 
There is a strong tradition of studying tool use as a specific behavioural domain in evolution-
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ary studies and primate ethology, and there good reason to adhere to this tradition to make this 
model fit better with the data. Also, it is not immediately clear that all the skills I've presented 
would fit into the “folk” modules (for example the skill of recognizing similarity might be 
linked to folk physics, but it seems to be a bit of a stretch) so easily. This could be a short-
coming of my model, showing that perhaps some other categorization could be more product-
ive, but at the time being I think my model shows coherence with regards to available data, 
and I will leave it at that.
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PART 3
Vision for cognition
3.1 Introduction
This last part of my thesis is written in a slightly philosophical and highly speculative manner. 
I do not intend for all the arguments and ideas that I put forward here to be regarded as final-
ized scientific claims; I will present no or very little empirical substantiation to back up any of 
them because I have no such data (yet!). Instead this part is intended to give an idea on a more 
general plane what it is that I am aiming for, and fuel discussion and hopefully generate new 
ideas and research. I also intend to discuss and clarify some of the ideas that is put forward in 
the previous parts. 
In this part I will argue that more advanced vision has both been an important prerequisite 
for the development of more advanced cognition in primates, and also a driving force in said 
evolution both for general cognition and certain specific abilities. This thesis is mainly 
focused on the first, more general way that vision, and especially allocentric vision, has been 
important for evolution of cognition by giving primates richer representational capabilities.  
However, I will sketch a few different specialized areas where it is feasible that allocentric 
vision has contributed in a more direct way to specific cognitive abilities. I might be wrong 
about some, most or all details, but I think that the general idea is strengthened by such 
examples even if they turn out to be wrong, because at least it is capable of generating falsifi-
able hypotheses.
3.2 Solving the unsolvable problem
How shape constancy is achieved by the visual system, the capacity to recognize  
the same shape as the same under a wide range of conditions, is a problem of  
nearly  unimaginable complexity  on which psychologists  of  perception are still  
hard at work. (Millikan, 2009, p. 176)
I have discussed the complexity of the problem of vision-for-perception in section 1.4.2. The 
visual system of humans obviously solves this problem, and I believe that there are two prin-
ciple features that makes it possible: processing power and specialization. I will discuss only 
the first of these, as any description of the specialized modules of the humans visual system 
would be way to lengthy for this thesis.
The human brain is very large compared to other animals both in absolute measures and 
relative measures. Larger animals normally have larger brains, but this does not in itself make 
them “smarter”. The larger brain is a bi-product of having a larger body to control and receive 
sensory input from. What does this tell us in the case of vision? The tactile senses scales up 
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with the size of the body, but is this also true when it comes to vision, hearing, smell and 
taste? This does not seem to be the case from a phenomenological standpoint. To be sure, hav-
ing a larger tongue with more gustatory sensors means that there is more information to be 
processed, but not in the same way that a larger body means more tactile sensory input and 
motor output. The function of the gustatory sensory system is to detect different tastes, and in 
a way it is not that important whether the tongue is large or small for this purpose, as long as 
it  has  enough  sensors  to  reliably  detect  the  different  tastes  that  it  needs  to  differentiate 
between. That our tongue is larger than that of rat nevertheless is probably just a consequence 
of us having a larger body, not because we have or need a more developed sense of taste. Just 
because an animal has a larger body it does not mean that this animal needs more gustatory 
information. The same holds for smell and hearing as well, basically. 
Vision is special in this regard. Being a large animal means that you need to see large 
things, because these are the things that you generally interact with. This means that your field  
of vision needs to be bigger, which means larger eyes, more photoreceptors and more visual 
information to process. But it does not scale in the way that the tactile senses scale, as the sur-
face area of a body grows exponentially with the enlargement of the body, but the visual field 
does not. And the amount of different smells and sounds that the animal needs to smell and 
hear do not scale at all, at least not as a direct factor of body size. This means that while we 
expect the brain to have a certain size relation to the body that it  resides in,  the relation 
between areas processing visual information and the general size of the brain is expected to be 
inverted; that is, when the brain is enlarged due to increased body size, the relative area of the 
brain that processes visual information is expected to get smaller. The same relation should 
also hold for hearing, smell and taste.
This is not the case with the human and primate brain. The amount of brain tissue that is 
involved in processing visual information is larger than expected compared to other mammals 
(Kaas, 2005), even in relation to the massively enlarged brain that humans have (EQ≈69). This 
is a clear indication of the idea that the human (and to a large degree primate) visual system 
can do things that other mammal's visual systems cannot. Philosophers, neurologists, engin-
eers  and  cognitive  scientists  are  in  agreement  that  vision-for-perception  (as  defined  by 
Goodale  and Milner (e.g.  1992)) is  an almost  impossibly complex problem to solve (e.g. 
Pinker,  1997; Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005; Millikan,  2009). I  am fairly certain that  the vast 
increase in processing power that the enlarged human and primate brains affords, is essential 
in the evolutionary solution to this problem, and this is probably the best indication that I can 
present to defend the (perhaps controversial) idea that most animals don't use vision in this 
way at all. Their small brains just can't deliver that processing power. The following is a sum-
mary of the main points presented in this thesis that support the idea that only primates have 
vision-for-perception, that is, conscious visual representations of the world.
• Primates have a fovea with densely packed photoreceptors, other animals have 
not. This gives primates central vision with much more detail than what is pos-
9 EQ = Encephalization Quotien, a relative measure of brain size, where the size of the body is taken into 
account. An EQ of 6 means that the human brain is six times larger, in relative terms, than the average brain 
of a mammal (Geary, 2009).
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sible without a fovea.10
• Humans and our closest primate relatives have trichromatic colour vision, most 
other animals have not; many do not have any colour vision at all. Being able to 
process the different wavelengths of light in this way yields more information 
about that which the light is reflected off of, which is likely to be of great help in 
identifying objects quickly and correctly.
• Humans and primates have a much larger portion of the brain devoted to pro-
cessing  visual  information  than  other  animals,  both  in  absolute  and  relative 
terms.
• The primate and especially human brain have a much more extensive differenti-
ation of neurologically distinct areas involved in visual processing compared to 
other animals. In the human brain there are about forty distinctly different areas, 
whereas many other animals only have a few. The problem of achieving vision-
for-perception  is  tremendously  hard,  and  its  solution  probably  demands  this 
great  differentiation together  with  the larger  brain affording  more processing 
power.
• Behavioural  evidence  suggest  that  many other  mammals  rely much more  on 
olfaction for identification purposes,  not least  in  identifying conspecifics and 
food. (Humans don't smell each others butts to learn about each other.) Vision is 
thought to aid in locomotive behaviour and eliciting conditioned or genetically 
programmed responses, without much room for adaptive modification of beha-
viour and no higher cognitive processes dealing with that visual information.
3.3 Vision versus olfaction
There are two fundamental ways in which I believe that the switch from olfaction to vision as 
primary sense for world interaction in primates have influenced and been an important factor 
in  the  evolution  of  primate  cognition.  The  first  is  a  more  general  way,  in  which  more 
advanced vision can support more detailed representations of the world than any other sense 
can provide, which allows for more specialized and diverse behaviour, which in turn demands 
more advanced cognition. The second way is that allocentric vision allows for “allocentric 
cognition”, specialized ways of representing and processing information about the world.
To avoid any unnecessary misunderstanding, it is worth pointing out that it is not necessary 
for an individual to actually be able to see for it to have the cognitive abilities that I consider 
to be evolutionary reliant on vision. Blind people are expected to have exactly the same cog-
nitive abilities as seeing people, as long as their blindness is not due to deficits in critical brain  
regions. In other word, my claim is only that vision has been important in the evolutionary 
10 It could also be noted that the design of the vertebrate eye is vastly superior to other designs common among 
for instance insects. It has been calculated that if humans had compound eyes like flies, we would need eyes 
with a diameter of 27 metres to see as accurately as the vertebrate design allows us to do (Dawkins, 1996).
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history of cognition, not in the developmental history of singular individuals. It is for example 
likely that our ability to mentally represent space and spatial qualities is closely tied to the 
visual cortex in the brain, and it would be the same brain region that is used by both blind and 
seeing persons. It has evolved through and for processing mainly visual input, but once it is 
there it can be used without having access to any visual input at all. 
The ultimate goal for the sensory systems of an organism is to create representations of 
that organism's environment, in order to adapt behaviour in a way that maximizes reproduct-
ive success. By representing its environment, an agent can adapt its behaviour in a purposeful 
way and not rely on trial and error behaviour which is likely to sooner and later get it killed. 
You can only walk of a cliff once, so once you've tried that you don't get the chance to try a 
different approach. If you on the other represent the cliff you can choose the appropriate beha-
viour to steer clear of such detrimental actions. Such representations can be conscious, as in 
the case of visual representations originating the ventral stream11, or unconscious, like the 
visuomotor transformations of the dorsal stream.
Representations of the world can originate from any sensory system of an organism, and 
can be of varying complexity. There are simple anaerobic bacteria called magnetosomes that 
through a magnetic sensory system represent the direction of less oxygen in their environ-
ment, which is all the information the bacteria needs to survive (Dretske, 1986). Their sensory 
systems consist of a single molecule that orients itself towards magnetic north, thereby repres-
enting that crucial piece of information. Humans on the other hand have access to a plethora 
of incredibly complex representations of very varying kinds that often can supply us with the 
information that we need to survive, and very much more. Other animals have other repres-
entational capabilities, that have been shaped by evolution according to their needs. 
One of the main points of this thesis is that primates seem to have evolved a unique repres-
entational capacity that allows us to construct a conscious visual representation of the world. 
This representation have some unique properties that include identification of objects, spatial 
structure and preserved relations of content. I argue that this representational capacity is a 
cornerstone in the evolution of more advanced cognition, as well as certain specific cognitive 
abilities that are closely tied to vision and allocentric processing.
Most other mammals use olfaction as their primary sensory system, primarily meaning that 
they use smell to identify objects in the world. This does not mean that these animals do not 
have any conscious visual perception of the world at, but it is very possible that this is in fact 
the case. It would certainly be a completely different kind of visual perception that does not 
include identification and recognition of objects. The absence of allocentric visual processing 
has the consequence that all visual stimuli are only processed in relation to the agent, and 
probably only used in visuomotor transformation that is unconscious.
Of course, many animals don't need to identify objects in the world at all. Frogs use vision 
to catch prey, but not through identifying objects in the world as prey, just by reacting to black 
dots of the right size moving across their retinas in the right way. As such phenomena ordinar-
ily happens to coincide with flies and other things that frogs eat being present, such a simple 
11 N.b. that not all representations originating the ventral stream have to be conscious, just that they could be, as 
opposed to those originating in the dorsal stream.
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behavioural mechanism is sufficient for a frog to survive in most settings (barring in a laborat-
ory with devious scientists projecting black dots onto frogs retinas). Thus the frog has no need 
for a more sophisticated visual system, so it has never evolved.
Perception through vision and through olfaction are very different processes.  Olfaction 
works through a number of different chemical receptors that activate when they encounter the 
type of molecule that they are built to detect. Molecular structure does not vary with lighting 
conditions, distance or any of the conditions that affect the retinal projections from an object, 
it is fixed and will activate the system exactly the same way every time (as long as the system 
is intact). Identification through this kind of chemical reception is therefore (comparatively) 
simple and reliable. But it is also inflexible. The olfactory system will only react to the kind of  
molecules that it has receptors for. Suppose an organism with olfaction as its primary percep-
tual channel cannot identify the materials uranium and ytterbium (not unlikely seeing that 
they are virtually non-existent in nature and so has not had any influence over the evolution of 
the  organisms  perceptual  system)  as  it  does  not  have  any  chemical  receptors  for  such 
molecules. It would be impossible for this organism to make any distinction between the two, 
or even to re-identify the a lump of uranium as the same lump of uranium on two occasions. 
These substances would literally be blanks in the organisms perceptual world, the same way 
that we can't through any of our senses perceive ultra-violet light, magnetic force or dark mat-
ter. We know (or suspect) that these things exist because we can see their effects or have 
mathematical proof that they should exist, but we will never be able to have a perceptual 
experience of them. It is reasonable to suspect that the olfactory system of any organism has 
chemical receptors for molecules that have been around during its evolution, and in particular 
for molecules that have carried information that has been of value to the organisms reproduct-
ive success. The visual system has an advantage in this respect, because it is able to register 
the light reflected of any surface whether or not that kind of surface has figured in the evolu-
tionary history of the visual system. I would not be able to identify a lump of uranium if I 
found one, but I could probably learn. At the very least I would be able to perceive such a 
lump as a lump of something, and I would be able to re-identify it and to recognize it as being 
different from other things that I have not seen before.
3.3.1 What is a primary sense?
This might be a good place to be more specific about what I mean by the term “primary 
sense”. It is not a widely used concept, although it appears from time to time in the literature. 
Most organisms have some way of getting information about their surroundings, as well as 
their own body (like balance, proprioception or hunger). The organism can have any amount 
of sensors, from only one to a plethora, functioning by the same principle (that is, reacting to 
the  same kind  of  stimuli),  and such a  perceptual  system is  in  common english called “a 
sense”. Most, if  not all, vertebrae have more than one sensory system reacting to external 
stimuli, and these systems are more often than not used for different purposes, or at least in 
different contexts. Most sighted animals use vision as the primary source of information to 
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guide locomotive behaviour, while using olfaction for identifying objects in the world, such as  
food, conspecifics etc. Humans and other primates use vision for both purposes. This is not to 
say that we can't use other senses for the same purposes. We also use touch to aid locomotion, 
especially when it is dark, and some blind people allegedly can use their hearing to get spatial 
information that can aid their moving around. We also use our sense of smell to identify food, 
especially to assess whether or not something has gone bad. However in most cases we use 
vision to identify objects. In order to identify an object as my bed, I can't smell, taste or listen 
to it. I might touch it and through a process of touching it in different places come to the con-
clusion that it is a bed, perhaps mine, but through vision I can see that it is in the blink of an 
eye. Considering the ease with which we humans, and allegedly other primates, can use vision 
to identify objects in the world it is no wonder that we are so reliant on it for so many of our 
sensory needs.
What I mean by primary sense or primary sensory system is the sensory system through 
which the organism identify objects in the world. There must of course not be any such thing 
as a primary sense for a certain organism, it is completely conceivable that there are organ-
isms that use two (or more) senses in an equivalent way to get such information (however see 
the next section on multimodal representational capabilities). It is also possible that the notion 
of a primary sense breaks down for all organisms except certain vertebrae, due to them not 
identifying objects at all, or just reacting in a genetically programmed way to predetermined 
stimuli without ever identifying anything. However, in the case of humans it makes perfect 
sense to regard vision in this way, and especially in comparison to animals that are reliant on 
olfaction for object identification purposes.
3.3.2 Multimodal representational capabilities
In humans, and possibly other primates too, there is a large degree of integration of the differ-
ent senses. We can experience the same thing or phenomenon in the world through more than 
one sense modality at the same time, and thus construct multimodal representations of things 
in the world. Not all animals have this ability, as described by Gärdenfors (2000) an adder, for 
instance,  uses  its  different  sense modalities  for  quite  different  purposes at  the  same time 
without (it seems) integrating them into a multimodal representation. This is to the disadvant-
age of the snake in certain circumstances, but apparently not often enough for the snake to 
have evolved a multimodal representational ability. 
Multimodal representation in humans is often centred around the visual modus. There are 
few circumstances where two or more senses are combined into a multimodal representation 
without vision being one of the senses. Provided you are not blind, how many things in the 
world do you know about only by a combination of sound and smell? Touch and taste? Any 
other such combination? I cannot think of any for myself. This should not be surprising at all, 
it is just a natural consequence of vision being our primary sense. I have no empirical data to 
justify the following claim, but it is a distinct possibility that the evolution of allocentric vis-
ion in primates was a prerequisite for humans to develop multimodal representational ability. 
Allocentric processing allows the visual system to relate parts of the visual field to each other, 
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and it is not much of a stretch to speculate that this ability might have been a stepping stone in 
developing the ability to relate different sense data to each other.
3.3.3 Speed, precision, distance and details
Visual perception has a quite few overarching attributes that makes it a more powerful sens-
ory system than olfaction. I will describe a few that are suitable for philosophical pondering.
The visual system can be updated with information about the world at the speed of light, 
the olfactory system with the speed of wind or the speed of the animal depending on the situ-
ation. Speed might not always be crucial when perceiving the world, but it could be in certain 
situations, and it provides a general benefit.
The visual system provides very precise information about the location of things, whereas 
olfaction detects the smell of a more loosely defined location and or direction. By seeing a 
tree I know exactly where that tree is,  both in relation to me as well as in relation to other 
visually  salient  aspects  of  the  world.  An animal  relying on olfaction for  this  information 
would certainly have access to more information than a human trying to locate something by 
smell, but because particles move erraticly compared to photons, it could never come close in 
precision even in theory.
Vision allows us to get information about parts of the world that are quite distant to our 
own position. Olfaction can provide information from some way away, but hardly from kilo-
metres away, not to mention the impossibility of smelling the moon or the sun. With distance 
the quality of the information that reaches the sensory system is  degraded,  reflected light 
becomes fainter with distance as it spreads out over ever larger volumes. But compared to the 
diffusion of smells over distance light is tremendously accurate. I find it hard to imagine that 
even the most elaborate of olfactory systems can distinguish two closely positioned targets 
from even a hundred metres away, something that is easily achieved in vision. Vision also 
makes it possible to distinguish details of that which is perceived, once again because of the 
physical properties of light; more precisely that light travels in straight paths, whereas odours 
(molecules) travel in more or less stochastic ways through the air blending and diffusing even 
over very short distances. Different parts of a uniform object will reflect light towards a spe-
cific point (e.g. a retina) in different ways as a result of distance and angle, making it possible 
to calculate the distance and angle of the object. However the smell of a surface at a 90 degree 
angle  will  not  differ  from the  smell  of  the  same object  at  a  45  degree  angle,  making it 
impossible to judge the angle by olfaction, whereas this is readily available information for 
visual processing. Having conscious access to such information is a necessity for perceiving 
shapes, at least in three dimensions and probably in two as well.
3.3.4 Functionality doesn't smell
That is not true, of course. Functionality does smell in many cases, from perfumes and other 
man made objects to pheromones and other signalling systems in biological organisms. But 
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much functionality does not smell. You cannot tell the straight twig that is suitable for termite 
fishing from the crooked one, or the sharp edged rock suitable for cutting from the blunt one, 
using your nose. Using objects as tools very often requires us to see them to determine their 
usefulness. A plate and a cup made from the same chunk of clay will at average smell the 
same, but only one of them will hold my coffee in a useful way. Tool use and manufacture 
would be incredibly hard without vision, all but impossible through olfaction alone, and more 
to the point I would dare assert that it would probably never have evolved without vision at 
all. Again, this is not to say that blind people cannot use tools, of course they can, but this is 
because they are the same species that have evolved this ability intertwined with the evolution 
of vision.
3.3.5 Spatial relations
One of the main feats of allocentric vision is that it can process and maintain spatial relations. 
Olfaction can possibly process and maintain some spatial relations, but as I sketched in a pre-
vious paragraph it has some severely limiting disadvantages compared to vision. Being able to  
process perceptual information that way means that you should be able to think about spatial 
relations too. Not being able to process such information however does not directly imply that 
you cannot think in such terms, but it makes it rather unlikely. It is hard to see what informa-
tion you would use for thinking in terms of relations if such information is not available, but 
even more to the point it is hard to see how and why such a thinking capacity could evolve 
without allocentric perceptual input. Even if one does not agree with Hobbes that there is 
nothing in the mind that has not first been in the senses (except for the mind itself), it is hard 
to imagine what our thought would contain if we had no sensory input.
From an evolutionary point of view it makes much more sense to say that the mind is there 
to process information from the senses, than saying that the senses are there to give the mind 
something to process. Thinking begins with sensory perception, what else would there be to 
think about? I would say that the same line of arguing holds for the evolution of thought also, 
the evolution of perception comes before the evolution of thought. It is therefore a good start-
ing point to assume that perception of spatial relations is a prerequisite for thinking about spa-
tial relations. Thinking about spatial relations is in turn important for a lot of problem solving, 
including judging size or distance differences or determining what fits together. Relying on 
olfaction to solve such problems could mean being stuck with a round peg in a square hole 
without ever realizing the problem. Such problems could of course be solved with the aid of 
tactile perception or echolocation, but I will get back to such sensory systems in a bit to dis-
cuss their drawbacks.
3.3.6 Movements and temporal relations
Appreciating movements is a special case of processing spatial relations, involving temporal 
relations. Basically the same line of argumentation as for perception of spatial relations is 
applicable, since perceiving movements in essence is tracking the change of spatial relations 
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over  time.  However,  this  capacity  seems  to  have  its  own  locus  of  processing  the  brain 
(Gazzaniga et al., 2009), making it worth mentioning in its own right. It might also be pos-
sible to link perception of movements to experiencing time, as conscious awareness of time 
probably would be radically different if you were not able to track movements. Animals other 
than humans probably have different time experiences, some might not have any conception 
of time passing at all, and it is more than likely that this is linked to the way that the animals 
perceive  the world through their  sensory systems.  Experiencing movements  and temporal 
relations through vision could therefore have shaped our time conception, laying the founda-
tion for sequential thinking and planning. Experiencing spatial and temporal relations is argu-
ably also the foundation for experiencing causality.
3.3.7 Vision versus the other senses
We should not be surprised that very few (if any) animals use ordinary hearing as a means of 
identifying objects in the world. Most objects make very little sound at all, and much that 
makes some sound only does this from time to time and often for specific purposes. Imaging 
trying to listen to a mushroom to conclude whether it is poisonous or not. Thus, hearing is not 
a likely candidate to ever be used as primary sensory system.
Gustation is similar to olfaction in many ways, they both react to chemical stimulation and 
are bound to use similar neural mechanisms. So why then is gustation rarely (or never) used 
as a means of identifying objects in the world? The answer is obvious of course. While olfac-
tion can detect chemicals over a distance, gustation requires the organism to take the object 
into its mouth or at least lick it. This is both cumbersome and possibly dangerous compared to 
olfaction. Should the object prove to be poisonous (or an enemy), it is too late. By smell an 
animal can steer towards food or other necessities, while the animal reliant on taste would 
wander aimlessly tasting the world hoping that something will be edible soon.
Some of the representations of the world that we can get through vision is also possible to 
get by means of tactile perception, such as certain spatial relations and shapes. Using our 
hands it is possible to avoid putting a round peg in a square hole, to judge relative size of two 
objects or to determine which of two stones is the sharpest. This is however possible only 
when such objects are directly available, trying to find these objects in the world probably 
entails both very lengthy and possibly dangerous searching by literally fumbling in the dark. 
Tactile sensory systems utilizing whiskers should have some advantage for certain tasks, but 
are still limited to a very narrow receptive field, and are probably only useful for sensorymo-
tor transformation.
In very many respects echolocation is similar to vision; it provides a three dimensional 
spatial array of the world with textural information about surfaces. Echolocation sensory sys-
tems can in many respects allow for allocentric processing, but I have found no literature that 
proclaim the existence of any such systems.  It is known to be used by bats, dolphins and 
whales, and while dolphins are regarded as among the most cognitively advanced animals, it 
is unclear whether they use echolocation for anything else than basic sensorymotor transform-
50
ation. The fact that they also have a visual sensory system ought to make the matter of con-
necting any cognitive abilities to a sensory system more complicated. Echolocation has sev-
eral disadvantages compared to vision as a sensory system though. The speed of sound is con-
siderably slower than that of light and the energy of sound waves also dissipates more rapidly 
over longer distances, meaning that the sensory radius will be smaller. Also, since sound is a 
true wave form (periodical displacement of matter) the spatial resolution of sensory arrays is 
bound to be less fine grained compared to vision (since light propagates directly through air), 
meaning that it is probably much more difficult to discriminate between small details in the 
sensory field. A completely different disadvantage of echolocation is that it requires the organ-
ism to constantly make sounds to receive information about the world, which requires energy 
and also signals your position to potential predators.
Compared to echolocation, vision is “free” in the sense that it uses the energy of the sun 
directly as information source, however this is a disadvantage of vision compared to all other 
senses as none of them are dependent on lighting conditions. No organisms that I know of 
(except humans) provide their own light source to see during night or underground.
3.4 Specific cognitive abilities derived from vision
I will present some specific abilities that I believe could have evolved by utilizing and devel-
oping processing capabilities of the visual system, or at the very least would not have evolved 
the way that they have in humans and those primates that possess them were it not for vision.
3.4.1 Understanding causality
In the research model that I presented in the previous part, I summarized some experimental 
and ethological evidence for causal understanding in primates. Said presentation does not pro-
claim to show that allocentric perception is necessary for causal understanding, but here I will 
argue that such I case could be made.
 According to David Hume (1739) we can never perceive causation, all we ever experience 
is on event following after another. This is in a sense trivially true, as causation is not a really 
a visible or perceivable phenomenon. But, as Hume also points out, we are naturally com-
pelled to  interpret  the  world as  containing a  natural  phenomenon such as  causality.  Kant 
(1781) would express this idea more directly by making the distinct point that experiencing 
causality in the world is inescapable, because causality is projected onto the world from our 
cognitive apparatus (my wording). If this is indeed true, and I believe that it is, then there is 
no real difference between perceiving a certain projection of light onto our retinas as an object 
and perceiving a temporal sequence of events as causally related. Our perceptual and cognit-
ive systems create both experiences in a compelling way. Whether there is actual causation in 
the world or actual objects in the world is not knowable, we only know that which our percep-
tual and cognitive systems construe out of the sense data that they receive12. In this sense there 
12 However it is reasonable to believe that our perceptions actually tell us something real about the world, other-
wise  this  information  would  probably  not  be  useful  for  guiding  successful  behaviour  for  surviving  and 
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is no difference between causation and other phenomena. We understand the world in terms of 
causal relations, and we act in accordance with this understanding, in much the same way that 
we act in accordance with our visual perception of objects (how else could we ever enjoy, or 
even stand, watching a game of football?).
Animals lacking allocentric vision might indeed perceive the world in the way that Hume 
described, as one event following another with no causal relation what so ever. But being able 
to experience visually one event following after another in a predictable way lays the founda-
tion for a perceptual system that picks up on this regularity. And once such a perceptual sys-
tem is in place it can also be utilized for representing such causal relations even when they are 
not happening right in front of you, and ipso facto you have a mental account of causality.
3.4.2 Problem solving by visualizing
Many cognitive problems can be solved by visualizing the problem and solution. Problem 
solving by visualizing involves creating a compound image like representation with relations 
between different parts. Examples of such visualizations of cognitive tasks include cognitive 
maps,  mental  rotation  and  comparing  visual  memories  of  objects.  These  are  all  classic 
examples of cognitive tasks that we solve by utilizing visual thinking, and are often put for-
ward as arguments for the thesis that we think with the aid of images. Thinking in images, 
which is hard to deny that we seem to be doing, is clearly related to vision and in these cases 
of solving certain problems it involves representing, maintaining and processing the relations 
within and between these images. In this case I believe that it is patently clear that allocentric 
processing is necessary, and that the evolution of such skills has sprung out of allocentric vis-
ion could hardly be considered a controversial idea.
3.4.3 Spatial thinking and arithmetics
Spatial  extension and counting goes together,  we generally think about numbers as a two 
dimensional extension and we plot things in space. You could of course count a number of 
auditory signals, or a number of tactile stimulations, but it is hard to think of any naturally 
occurring situations where this could have been useful for any organism. Counting occur-
rences of a phenomenon in time is just not as much use as being able to count spatially occur-
ring phenomena13, such as the number of rivals in a certain direction or fruits on a tree, etc. 
Auditory and tactile sensory systems allow the organism to count chronological occurrences 
of phenomena, while vision allows it to count spatially occurring phenomena. I don't even 
know how any counting could be achieved through olfaction or gustation, counting taste or 
smell seems similar to counting water or air – it just isn't countable.
Counting things in the visual field is in a way relating these things to each other, at least to 
propagating genes. I.e. the fact that our perceptual and cognitive systems have evolved through natural selec-
tion makes it likely that they convey real information about the world, at least in some respects.
13 Being able to count measures of time is a wholly different thing than being able to count sequential phenom-
ena, and is conceivably useful to many organisms, however I do not know if any animals can do it.
52
avoid counting the same thing more than once. In an ordered universe where everything was 
placed in neat lines or other patterns, this would not be a problem, but in the less ordered 
world where things are more scattered, being able to relate different visual objects to each 
other seems to be at the very least helpful when counting. A related ability is to be able to 
assess which of two amounts is larger, which maybe could be considered a kind of proto-
counting ability. In this situation there is no doubt that being able to relate two parts of the 
visual field to each other is necessary.
Humans can of course do a lot more mathematical operations than relating amounts and 
counting objects (what different primates can do in these fields is a little less well known). 
But I find it entirely possible that both arithmetics as well as geometrics as mental operations 
have a foundation in the visual system. We tend to rely on visual representations both when 
learning to count (counting on our fingers or using abaci) but also later in life for both every-
day calculations as well as more advances mathematics (graphs, geometrical figures, etc).
Just to speculate a little about why mathematical abilities has arisen among primates, it 
could very well be the case that since most primates live in socially organized groups and eat 
a lot of things like fruit and nuts that are collected, it could maybe be a matter of distributing 
foodstuffs  among group  members  according  to  hierarchical  other  social  structures.  Many 
other mammals eat leaves or grass that is not easily countable, or share a single prey.
3.4.4 Sequential thinking and planning
True planning behaviour is almost unknown among animals, except for humans that some-
times seem to do nothing but plan ahead (e.g. Gärdenfors, 2000). Recently there have been 
reports of planning among chimpanzees (Osvath, 2009), and evidence for planning behaviour 
among other apes is not unlikely to be presented within a few years. Planning requires think-
ing in steps: first this, then that, and sometimes if... then. Sequential thinking of this kind can 
be argued to demand an understanding of temporal relations, which I have already discussed. 
It is possibly also related to causal understanding.
Thinking in sequences requires us to be able to relate two or more instances of thought to 
each other, a kind of allocentric cognition or processing. There could of course be allocentric 
processing without allocentric perception, but the question arises what use allocentric pro-
cessing would be without that kind of sensory input. There could be some use to be sure (any-
thing could be useful for something), but could it provide a benefit that is large enough for it 
to have evolved in any animal? And if so, would it provide enough benefit to be sustained 
through further evolution,  considering that it  demands an expensive14 neural  system to be 
achieved. If a part of an organism has a higher cost to develop and maintain than the benefits 
it bestows to that organism, evolution will favour those that do not have that part resulting in 
its eventual elimination in the highly unlikely event that it is ever developed.
14 Expensive in three senses: Firstly that it costs the organism to develop the system during ontogeny, secondly 
that it is expensive in the sense that it demands energy to be sustained and used, and thirdly that it is a com-
plex system that has a high risk of failure due to injury or disease.
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3.4.5 Social anticipation and reading thoughts
Most primate species live in groups, some – like us humans – in very large groups compared 
to other mammals. Group dynamics and social interaction is an important part of primates 
lives; understanding and negotiating social situations can be fundamentally important for sur-
vival and gene propagation (e.g. de Waal, 1982; McGrew, 2004), an outcast animal will have 
a  hard  time staying alive  and probably even harder  time procreating.  Many things  in  an 
animal's environment will behave in a highly predictable way: all inanimate objects are just 
that, vegetation is highly sedentary and so forth. For many species of animals conspecifics 
will behave in very predictable ways too, but this is not necessarily the case for primates, and 
certainly not for humans. Even though human behaviour can seem very predictable to us at 
times, it is far less predictable than the behaviour of virtually all other things that we come in 
contact with. From the diverse repertoire of behaviour that has been demonstrated by apes and 
monkeys alike, this also seems to be the case in the social contexts of our primate cousins.
Being able  to  predict  conspecific  behaviour  becomes  a  very important  part  of  life,  to 
understand and negotiate social interaction. So how can you predict that which is unpredict-
able? Humans do it  by assessing each others cognitive and emotional states. We are very 
adept at reading each others mental states and attitudes through facial expressions and bodily 
postures, and there is good reason to believe that this could also be the case for other primates. 
Other animals also react to such visual displays, dogs for instance are intimidated or agitated 
by the showing of teeth. However it is likely that allocentric processing of the subtle vari-
ations in conspecifics facial expressions and bodily postures allows for a much more flexible 
and diverse understanding of social situations. After all, the variations that we are able to pick 
up on can be very minute, and still have a profound influence on our assessment of the person 
or situation. Millions of people have for centuries been fascinated by the ever so slight smile 
of Mona Lisa by da Vinci. Dogs can be trained to react to even more subliminal variations 
(mostly behavioural patterns), as in the case of seizure response dogs, but I feel fairly certain 
that the signals that they pick up on only elicit their conditions response, not an understanding 
of their ward's mental state.
By scanning another person's facial expression and bodily posture we can learn a great 
deal about that person's emotions, attitude and disposition, giving us a much better basis for 
prediction of that person's subsequent behaviour; to a certain degree one could be excused for 
saying that it is a kind of thought reading. And it is not hard to see why a propensity for 
thought reading would evolve. Of course there are other ways that this could be done, and 
indeed is done. We get very similar information from the tone of someone's voice and other 
prosodic features. Similarly animals that have a keen sense of smell are likely to be able to 
assess other animals internal states by variations in odour of that animal's bodily secretions. 
My point is not that allocentric vision gives primates some unique benefit in predicting con-
specific behaviour, but that it affords a new way of social prediction that just might be more 
flexible and capable than other systems.
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3.4.6 Imitation
One ability that is though to be very important for social interaction and learning (Bjorklund 
and Bering, 2003), as well as the evolution of language (Arbib, 2009) is the ability to mimic. 
Most primates do not have the ability to imitate, and apes only have it  to a weak degree 
(Arbib, 2009), while humans can get pretty good at imitating quite early in life.15 Nonverbal 
imitation is of course heavily reliant on vision; successfully imitating nonverbal behaviour on 
the basis of olfaction, gustation or hearing is probably impossible, with a few exceptions. Per-
ceiving behaviour through vision does in most cases demand allocentric perception (relating 
different parts of the observed body to each other and the environment, etc.) and it is therefore 
quite  possible  that  imitation would not  have been possible  without  this  skill.  In  turn this 
would mean that allocentric vision was a prerequisite in the evolution of language and differ-
ent kinds of social cognition. I will not elaborate this thought further here, I merely include it 
as a possible selling argument for future investigation.
3.5 Vision driving cognitive evolution
Human cognition allows us to do so much more than any other species. I have tried to show 
several different ways through which our visual sensory system has been a pivotal factor in 
the evolutionary shaping of our cognition. There are two more general factors that I believe 
are more important than anything else in driving cognitive evolution, and that is social inter-
action and representational capabilities. I will end this thesis by discussing how the advance-
ment of our visual system has been important in a more overarching way for making us able 
to think the way that we do. 
Before I do that, however, I would like to emphasize that while I believe that visual allo-
centric perception is a key component in human cognitive evolution, that does not mean that 
the other sensory systems have been unimportant. Our auditive system is likely to have been a 
very driving force, especially in the last million years of our evolution, and especially with 
regards  to  social  interaction  and  representational  capabilities.  The  development  of  more 
advanced communicative skills has perhaps been the most important factor for our overall 
cognitive capacities, and this development is of course closely linked with our auditive sys-
tem. For the most part, this development does not seem to be shared with our primate relatives  
and researchers believe that the evolution of human language happened between 1,2 million 
years and a hundred thousand years ago. In the scope of shared evolution with other primates 
it therefore seems safe to insist that vision has been the most important sensory system for 
cognitive evolution.
15 It is likely that imitation is a very important part of human development, making this a likely candidate for a 
biologically defined ability. Imitation seems to be something that comes very natural to children, even to the 
degree that they seem find great joy in imitating others.
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3.5.1 Vision in social interaction
Allocentric visual perception has the advantage over other kinds of perception that it allows 
the agent to take in complex social situations, involving a multitude of conspecifics, their 
interaction and their spatial relation to each other. Even at a glance, a fairly rich overview of a 
social situation is readily available. More developed allocentric perception also allows the 
agent to get an understanding both of what conspecifics are looking at, but also what they can 
see from their perspective. Who is looking at who? Who is looking at me? Where could I go 
so that X cannot see me? Allocentric visual perception can answer these sorts of questions for 
the agent, which of course would help with planning behaviour in complex social settings, 
and also allows for certain kinds of deception.
It has been shown that animals that display higher levels of social interaction tend to have 
a higher EQ compared to similar animals with less social interaction, and the fairly obvious 
conclusion from this has been that social interaction drives the evolution of more complex 
cognition and therefore larger brains. I see no need to challenge this assumption as it seems 
both parsimonious in regards to the data, as well as plausible from a common sense view. But 
I also find it unlikely that this is a one-way street, but rather that more developed cognition 
allows for more social interaction as well, even when said cognition has not evolved to solve 
problems of social interaction. This is of course a pretty obvious statement to most researchers 
in this field, but I believe that it serves as a good parallel to what I believe is the case with the 
development of human visual perception.
At any rate, the switch from olfaction to vision as primary sense for recognizing conspecif-
ics does allow for more complex interactive behaviour in social settings to evolve. It is a pos-
sibility that this switch happened due to increasing need for better information about social 
interaction, but it I find it hard to believe that this could be the only factor, although it is very 
possible that it played an important part.
3.5.2 Representations and thought
The switch from olfaction to vision as the primary sensory system in primates made possible a 
much more flexible  way of creating representations of the world.  Representations are the 
cornerstones of concepts, and concepts form the basis for thinking. All concepts have their 
basis in perception in some way or another. This idea is heralded by Jesse Prinz (2004) and I 
agree. Concepts are our way of organizing our perceptions and thoughts of the world. A being 
without any perceptual systems would have no need for concepts. This is not the place to 
argue for this account, but those that do not agree on this premise will probably still agree that 
many of our concepts have a perceptual basis. For Prinz it is of importance that concepts can-
not be innate, but must be learned by the cognitive system that uses them. This is where I and 
Prinz part ways in our views. Even if all concepts must have a perceptual basis, I see no 
reason to postulate that they must have a perceptual basis in the ontogeny of the organism that 
uses them. As long as they have a perceptual basis in the phylogeny of that organism, that is 
enough for me to satisfy the criteria of being perceptually based. Our tendency to acquire con-
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cepts in a certain way is reliant on our perceptual systems, and in particular our visual system, 
and our perceptual systems have been constructed through the process of evolution to accom-
modate creating representations and concepts in a way that has been historically useful for us 
as organisms. 
I would perhaps dare go so far as to say that the ability to use concepts is the same ability 
as being able to think. Using concepts can of course be a lot of different things. It could be 
argued that simply having a concept is to be able to think of that concept. That is something 
that I think that many animals with sensory systems can do. However, some animals might be 
able to manipulate concepts in different ways which is a more developed form of thinking. 
Concepts are of course essential for language.
The development of the representational powers of the primate visual system has allowed 
us to form and use more powerful and flexible concepts. But it has also laid the foundation for 
more  powerful  and flexible  manipulation  of  our  concepts.  Visual  perception  allows us  to 
understand the world in a way that is just not possible through our our other senses.
Visual perception and cognition have most certainly evolved together in primates, the one 
would not be useful without the other. As the senses provide the information that is needed for 
cognition, the form of the sensory information is crucial to what cognition is possible. I have 
already stated that I don't believe to be possible to draw a definitive line between vision and 
cognition, it is an integrated system and in a way thinking starts in the eyes, at least from an 
evolutionary perspective.
3.6 Conclusion
The research into the two streams of the human visual system has shown good evidence for a 
functional division, but it is far from resolved exactly what is the best way to describe that 
division. However, it seems clear that the dorsal stream handles most or all visuomotor trans-
formation in an egocentric frame of reference, and that the ventral stream is more involved in 
conscious perception with the aid of an allocentric frame of reference, and that the latter is a 
neurological development unique to primates. This also suggests that conscious visual experi-
ence might be an uncommon thing in the biological realm, perhaps even unique to primates.
It seems to be proven beyond doubt that many primates other than humans are able to pro-
cess visual information in an allocentric frame of reference, though behavioural data is scarce 
for many species. The model presented in this thesis suggests that the evidence can be divided 
into three categories that  encompass different kinds  of behaviour,  namely tool use,  social 
interaction and reasoning, and propose guidelines for future research of the allocentric capab-
ilities of different primate species.
The evolutionary switch from olfaction to vision as a primary sensory system in primates 
has served to enrich our inner worlds with a more organized representational capability, as 
allocentric vision preserves relational information about the world that is lost through other 
senses. This is likely to have been the prerequisite for the evolution of more advanced cogni-
tion in general as well as more specialized cognitive abilities, such as spatial thinking, plan-
ning behaviours and many skills for social interaction.
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